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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
1 OVERVIEW
The information that has come to light in the opening months of the year has continued to 
point to the increasing buoyancy of the world economy. This has been extensive to the 
main regions – advanced and emerging alike – and has thus prolonged the trend observed 
since mid-2017. This outlook, underpinned by the continuing expansionary stance of 
monetary policies, has been further boosted by the fiscal expansion plans laid out by the 
United States, which include tax cuts and an increase in infrastructure spending. Most 
recently, world trade has retained its notable dynamism which, moreover, has also been 
widespread from the geographical standpoint. Along with certain transitory factors, the 
sound recent performance of international trade is linked to the strength of investment, a 
particularly import-intensive demand component, and, in the case of the emerging 
economies, to improved purchasing power prompted by the rise in commodities prices. 
The latest information points to the upturn continuing, although the areas of risk have not 
disappeared. One such area where risks are most prominent is related to the process of 
monetary policy normalisation in the advanced economies and, most especially, in the 
United States, which is ahead in the business cycle. In early February there was an abrupt 
share prices slump and increased volatility on the main global stock markets, apparently 
triggered by the emergence of US economic data suggesting a sharper than anticipated 
rise in wages (see Box 3). These developments are a warning that the current expansionary 
process may face setbacks should similar surprises recur, and that might give rise to 
changes in the projected pace of interest rate rises by the Federal Reserve and cause 
abrupt changes in financial asset prices. This possibility appears to have been exacerbated 
by the US budgetary impulse which, in the current setting, might take the form rather of 
inflationary rises than increases in activity, as well as resulting in a bigger US public 
finances shortfall and external deficit (see Box 2). 
In the euro area, the available indicators suggest that activity continues to expand at a high 
pace in the opening months of the year. Behind this trajectory are the expansionary 
financial conditions induced by the accommodative monetary policy stance, the strong 
momentum of the global economy – which is providing for vigorous exports even in the 
presence of an exchange rate appreciation – and, possibly too, some abatement in political 
uncertainty. As regards consumer prices, the recent path of the core component still offers 
no conclusive signs of reacting to the cyclical upturn. That said, the progressive decline in 
the degree of productive slack may be expected to ultimately raise the upward pressures 
on wages and prices, a development that would be assisted by the ECB maintaining its 
expansionary monetary policy stance. The latest ECB projections, published in early 
March, revised expected GDP growth for the area as a whole for this year upwards by 0.2 
pp to 2.4 %, a similar rate to that observed in 2017.
The Spanish economy has continued to exhibit considerable dynamism in early 2018. 
Specifically, it is estimated that, as in the last two quarters of 2017, GDP will have grown 
by 0.7% in Q1 this year. The outlook for the 2018-2020 period, set out in Box 1 of this 
Report, augurs a prolongation of the expansionary phase, although the intensity of growth 
is expected to gradually ease over the projection horizon. As a result, following the 
projected increase of 2.7% on average for this year, output is expected to increase at a 
rate of 2.3% in 2019 and 2.1% in 2020, tending thus to draw progressively closer to the 
estimated potential growth rate for the economy (see Box 6). 
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These favourable projections rest on the headway made in correcting the economy’s 
imbalances, and, from a more conjunctural perspective, on the ongoing firmness of activity 
and world trade, on the persistence of favourable financing conditions for economic 
agents  and on a somewhat more expansionary fiscal policy stance than that projected to 
date. In addition, this outlook has been supported by some easing in the political 
uncertainty linked to the situation in Catalonia. 
However, the pace of growth of export markets is expected to slow during the projection 
period, while the additional impact of the monetary policy measures adopted to date on 
output growth rates will move on a diminishing course, with both factors warranting the 
gradual easing in the rate of increase in activity. In parallel, the improved financial position 
of households and firms, along with enhanced external competitiveness, which is resulting 
in recurrent surpluses in the rest of the world account, increase the economy’s resilience 
to potential shocks. 
As regards prices, there was recently a notable slowdown in the overall indicator to a low 
of 0.6% in January, before a rebound commenced a month later. These developments 
have been much influenced by the base effects in the energy component. While the core 
component continued to evidence a degree of slackness, to which both non-energy 
industrial goods prices and services prices contributed, this appears to have been 
interrupted in February. In the course of 2018, the rate of change of the CPI is expected to 
undergo swings related to the trajectory of oil prices. As a result, after reaching a growth 
rate of over 1.5% in the summer months, the CPI is expected to slow once more in the final 
stretch of the year. Subsequently, it is estimated there will be a gradual rise in the overall 
inflation indicator, as a result of the impact of the reduction in cyclical slack on the rate of 
increase of the core indicator. 
Against this macroeconomic backdrop, characterised by a growing positive output gap in 
the Spanish economy, expansionary and, therefore, procyclical budgetary policies should 
be avoided. Conversely, economic policies should prioritise further headway in fiscal 
consolidation, allowing a gradual reduction in the budget deficit in structural terms and in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio, in accordance with the requirements laid down in the Stability 
and Growth Pact at the European level, and with the budgetary stability law on the 
domestic front. Fiscal consolidation is necessary in order to mitigate the vulnerability of 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rates of change based on seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP and on original series in that of the consumer price indices.
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the economy derived from the current high public debt and to restore the stabilising 
capacity of the public budget in the event of potential adverse shocks. In parallel, the 
current macroeconomic context is particularly propitious for undertaking the structural 
reforms still outstanding, which should be geared to improving productivity dynamics, 
addressing the challenges arising from population ageing and reducing structural 
unemployment.
The Report has a total of eight boxes. The first presents the macroeconomic projections 
for the Spanish economy for the three-year period from 2018 to 2020. There are then three 
boxes covering the external environment of the Spanish economy; respectively, these 
describe the change in the stance of US economic policies (Box 2), assess the stock 
market correction episode in early February (Box 3) and analyse the explanatory factors 
behind the recent dollar depreciation (Box 4). Box 5 details the latest developments in the 
debate on euro area governance reform. Lastly, Boxes 6 to 8 examine various aspects 
relating to the Spanish economy, respectively addressing an assessment of the current 
cyclical position, an analysis of the factors underlying the non-tourism services export 
performance since the crisis, and a diagnosis of the recent pension schemes and funds 
reform.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 13 March 2018.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c Latest available figure for the consumer price indices: February 2018.
2017 2018
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MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a) TABLE 1
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This latest update of the Banco de España’s macroeconomic 
projections for the Spanish economy includes the new information 
obtained since the last projections were published in December 
2017.1 The exercise includes, in particular, the Quarterly National 
Accounts data for the last quarter of 2017, and also information on 
the changes in the technical assumptions on which the projection 
exercise is based (see Table 1).2
The projections envisage a continuation of the current expansionary 
phase of the Spanish economy. This outlook is based, on one 
hand, on the gradual correction of the macrofinancial imbalances 
that built up in the expansionary cycle which preceded the crisis 
and in the more deeply recessionary stages of the crisis. This 
correction has given rise, in particular, to lower private sector debt, 
continued and sizeable external surpluses and the consequent 
moderation in net external borrowing, the gradual correction of the 
budget deficit, the fall in unemployment, which is however still too 
high, and the stabilisation and incipient recovery of the real estate 
sector. On the other hand, a number of more temporary factors 
also continue to support economic activity, such as the strength of 
the export markets, against a backdrop of ever more widespread 
global growth, and the expected expansionary stance of demand 
policies throughout the projection horizon. In particular, on the 
information available at this stage (which does not include the 
draft State Budget as it has still not been published), and following 
the neutral fiscal policy stance observed in 2017, a return to a 
somewhat more expansionary stance is expected as from 2018.
GDP has grown at a rate of more than 3% in the last three years; 
it is estimated that it will grow at a somewhat lower rate over the 
projection horizon. On one hand, the outlook for the global 
economy points to a gradual loss of momentum of the external 
markets. On the other, the present rate of expansion of economic 
activity in the euro area makes it more likely that inflation will 
converge towards its medium-term target. This reduces the need 
for additional monetary policy measures, in a setting in which the 
measures adopted previously should have a progressively lower 
incremental impact on financial conditions, activity and prices. 
Moreover, as discussed below, household spending on consumer 
goods and services should continue to show the signs of 
moderation that first appeared in 2017. The short-term information 
suggests that GDP growth in 2018 Q1 may have remained at the 
level of 0.7% observed in the third and fourth quarters of 2017. 
The minor slowdown in activity that is expected in coming quarters 
would give GDP growth of 2.7% in 2018, 2.3% in 2019 and 2.1% 
in 2020 (see Table 2).
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2018‑2020)
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2017-2020): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2017 
joint forecasting exercise.
2  The cut-off date for the assumptions underlying the December 2017 
projections was 22 November. The cut-off date for preparation of the 
assumptions underlying this exercise is 9  March, except for those 
relating to Spain’s export markets, for which the assumptions for the 
current exercise are taken from the March 2018 ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, whose cut-off date is 13 February. Lastly, 
the cut-off date for preparation of these projections is 13 March.
2017 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020
International environment
0.01.02.05.37.39.36.3tuptuo dlroW    
0.02.01.06.31.40.52.5stekram tropxe s'niapS    
7.11.28.21.951.164.464.45)level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
60.060.060.032.132.132.131.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Nominal effective exchange rate against the non-euro area (c)
    (2000 = 100 and percentage differences) 117.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 3.2 3.2 3.2
2.01.00.04.01.0-3.0-3.0-)d( )robiruE htnom-3( setar tseretni mret-trohS    
3.0-2.0-2.0-2.29.15.16.1)d( )dleiy dnob raey-01( setar tseretni mret-gnoL    
Changes from the December 
2017 projections (b)
March 2018 projections
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 9 March 2018. Cut-off date for foreign markets assumptions: 13 February 2018. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; 
the figures expressed as rates are calculated on the basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for world output and export markets, in levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, in percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and in percentage points for interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
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The prolongation of the expansionary phase, on the back of 
increased capacity utilisation, will give rise to a gradual pick-up in 
the rate of growth of the underlying component of the CPI which, 
after climbing by 1.2% in 2018, is expected to accelerate to 1.9% 
in 2020. In the case of headline inflation, the projections point to 
an average annual rate of change of 1.2% in 2018, rising to 1.7% 
in 2020.
The main changes in the assumptions on which these projections 
are built in comparison with the December projections concern 
budgetary policy. In this respect, the recent agreement on public 
sector pay and employment between the Government and the 
main trade union organisations for the period 2018-20203 is 
particularly noteworthy. The agreement includes a fixed pay 
increase for public sector employees of 6% in cumulative terms in 
the period (1.75% in 2018, 2.25% in 2019 and 2% in 2020). It also 
establishes two additional tranches that are dependent on certain 
conditions being met; if these conditions are satisfied, the 
cumulative increase would be just under 9%.4 As regards public 
sector employment, the agreement adds momentum in 2018 to 
the more dynamic hiring policy of the past two years.5 In particular, 
it broadens the range of cases where up to 100% of general 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2018‑2020) (cont’d)
Changes from the December 
2017 projections
2017 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020
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5.03.01.03.45.42.47.4secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
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0.02.05.08.38.39.30.4PDG lanimoN
0.00.02.07.15.12.10.1rotalfed PDG
0.01.-02.0-7.14.12.10.2)IPC( xedni ecirp remusnoC
CPI excluding energy and unprocessed food prices 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.9 0.0 0.1 0.1
3.03.04.09.10.27.28.2)stnelaviuqe emit-lluf( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force). 
End-of-period data 16.5 14.2 12.6 11.0 0.1 0.4 0.3
Unemployment rate (% of labour force). 
Average data 17.2 15.1 13.3 11.6 0.2 0.1 0.1
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) of the nation (% of GDP) 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5
General government net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) (% of GDP) -3.1 -2.5 -2.1 -1.7 0.1 0.1 0.1
March 2018 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure: 2017 Q4.
a Projections cut-off date: 13 March 2018.
Units left-hand scale
4  In particular, regarding the pay increase, the first variable tranche is tied 
to economic growth: if GDP grows by 2.5% or more in 2019 and 2020, 
the pay increase would be 2.5% in 2019 and 3% in 2020. If GDP grows 
by less than 2.5%, the pay increase would decline in proportion to the 
extent to which the figure falls short of 2.5%. The second variable 
tranche consists in adding a further 0.55 pp to the 2020 pay increase if 
the budgetary stability target is met.
5  See the agreement signed between the Government and the trade 
unions on 29 March 2017 (available only in Spanish). In this respect, see 
also the discussion in “General government employment over the past 
decade”, Economic Bulletin 4/2017, Economic Notes, Banco de España.
3  See http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/minhap/ 
Paginas/2018/090318-funcionarios.aspx (available only in Spanish).
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government staff vacancies may be filled (and adds some cases 
where the replacement rate may be even higher), and includes 
additional measures relating to working hours and temporary 
employment. The agreement includes certain conditional factors 
tied to compliance with the budgetary rules.
At the cut-off date for this exercise, the draft State and Social 
Security Budget for 2018 had not been submitted. Accordingly, as 
in December 2017, various technical assumptions have been used 
to estimate the expected trajectories of fiscal policy variables. It 
has been assumed, first, that the budget headings subject to 
greater scope for discretion – notably including, by virtue of their 
volume, procurement and public investment – will evolve in 
keeping with the nominal potential growth of the Spanish economy 
and the latest developments in budget outturn,6 and second, that 
all other general government account items will evolve, in the 
absence of measures, in keeping with their usual determinants.7
In accordance with these assumptions and projections on fiscal 
policy variables, and with the output gap estimated on a consistent 
basis within the whole projection exercise, the fiscal policy stance 
is set to be slightly expansionary in 2018, compared with the 
neutral stance estimated for 2017.
As regards all the other assumptions, there are few new developments 
and their impact on activity and prices tend to cancel one another 
out. The main change, in terms of its effects on the projections, is the 
improved global economic outlook, which is reflected in the upward 
revision, by 0.3 percentage points in cumulative terms between 2018 
and 2019, in the rate of growth of Spain’s export markets. In addition, 
since the cut-off date for the previous projections, the euro exchange 
rate has appreciated further, by 3.3 pp in effective nominal terms and 
rather more markedly (by 5.4  pp) against the dollar. Oil prices in 
dollars have risen slightly more than expected, especially in the short 
term, hence the upward revision of 4.9% for 2018 (tempered to a 
great extent in euro terms by the appreciation of the currency) and 
the more modest downward revision for 2019 and 2020.
In accordance with the expectations implicit in the yield curves, 
since the cut-off date for the assumptions underlying the previous 
projections the expected trajectory for interbank market rates has 
moved up, while the expected trajectory for government debt 
yields has moved down. In any event, these are minor changes, 
with a negligible impact on the expected cost of lending to 
households and non-financial corporations. 
On the impacts estimated drawing on historical evidence, the 
changes in the assumptions overall – including the fiscal policy 
assumptions – compared with the December projections would 
give rise to an upward revision of expected GDP growth of 
approximately 0.1 pp in each of the three years of the projection 
horizon. This is mainly attributable to the expansionary fiscal 
measures (in particular, the stronger growth expected in public 
sector pay and employment) and, to a lesser extent, to the 
improved situation of the external markets, factors which are 
restrained somewhat by the exchange rate appreciation.
This revision of the outlook for Spanish economic activity is slightly 
more extensive in the first years of the exercise than would be 
justified by automatic application of the effect of the new 
assumptions. Specifically, the upward revisions to GDP growth 
amount to 0.3 pp in 2018, 0.2 pp in 2019 and 0.1 pp in 2020. This 
reflects a combination of factors. First, the information on the 
opening months of 2018 points to a somewhat higher rate of 
growth in Q1 than was expected at the end of 2017, and this more 
favourable pattern is also being carried over into Q2. Second, the 
flow of data on the external environment of the Spanish economy 
received in the month that has elapsed since the cut-off date for 
the relevant assumptions has been more positive than expected at 
the time. Lastly, the baseline scenario includes a slight easing of 
the political tension in Catalonia, as a consequence of the decline 
in the level of uncertainty since December.
In terms of growth in consumer prices, the impact of the new 
assumptions is broadly neutral, since the upward effects deriving 
from the fiscal expansion are countered by the exchange rate 
appreciation and by the rather more moderate rate of growth of oil 
prices in 2019 and 2020. However, the information now available 
on the most recent period warrants a downward revision of 0.2 pp 
in the rate of change of CPI for 2018, essentially owing to the 
performance of the energy component in the last few months. The 
projections for 2019 and 2020 are virtually unchanged. 
In the projection period, spending on consumer goods and services 
will continue to be underpinned by the strength of the job creation 
process, continuing favourable financial conditions and the 
improvement in recent years in the financial position of the sector, as 
a consequence of the reduction in indebtedness and the appreciation 
in both real and financial asset prices. However, it is estimated that the 
slowdown observed in this spending component in 2017 will continue. 
This is as a result of various factors. First, spending decisions on 
consumer durables, which had been put off during the years of the 
crisis and which households have gradually resumed in the recovery 
years,8 are expected to peter out over the projection period. Second, 
it is estimated that households will start to rebuild their savings from 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2018‑2020) (cont’d)
6  The projections also include possible costs associated with the public 
liability arising from court proceedings relating to toll motorway company 
insolvency proceedings, which the Government estimates as around 
€2 billion.
7  Specifically it has been assumed that public revenue will increase in 
keeping with its tax bases, which depend mainly on the macroeconomic 
environment. Similar assumptions have been made for expenditure 
items that offer less scope for discretion. This is the case of pensions 
(where developments are essentially determined by the revaluation 
formula established by law and population ageing), unemployment 
benefits (which depend mainly on the level of unemployment) and 
interest payments (affected by changes in public debt levels and interest 
rates).
8  J. González Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2015), “Consumption dynamics in 
Spain by product type”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de 
España, pp. 29-37.
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BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2018‑2020) (cont’d)
the low level estimated at the end of 2017 (just under 6% of disposable 
income, the lowest level since the start of 2008). Indeed, in 2017 
households experienced a squeeze on their real income as a result of 
a temporary rebound in inflation that agents apparently recognised as 
such, since they responded by reducing both their real spending and 
their saving. The assumption underlying these projections is that 
households will tend to moderate their consumer spending, in favour 
of a certain degree of recovery in their saving rate.
Lastly, the projections assume a rise in interest rates which, per se, 
has a minor impact on household income as it affects interest paid 
and interest received alike. However, it also has a negative effect 
on consumption, given that borrowers generally have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume than creditors.
In the case of gross fixed capital formation, it is expected that the 
residential component will continue to post high rates of growth, 
albeit slightly lower than those observed in 2017, in a context in 
which the trend towards favourable mortgage terms (such as lower 
interest rates and longer repayment periods) seen in recent years 
looks to be starting to fade and net lending by households has fallen 
sharply. Business investment, for its part, will continue to be 
underpinned by the strength of demand and the increase in capacity 
utilisation, in a setting in which the high generation of internal funds 
and the availability of borrowed funds on favourable conditions will 
continue to ease the way for financing of business investment.
Over the projection period as a whole, exports should continue to 
grow at a faster pace than their destination markets, thanks to the 
competitiveness gains achieved since the crisis and which are 
expected to continue into coming years, albeit at a slower pace. In 
the near term, however, the rate of growth of export sales will be 
mitigated by the effects of the appreciation of the euro since early 
2017. By components, it is estimated that tourism services will 
moderate somewhat following the exceptional performance in 
recent years, as some Spanish tourist destinations become 
overcrowded and alternative destinations in the Mediterranean 
basin start to recover. Imports, for their part, as in other recent 
projection exercises, are expected to grow at a slower pace than 
their historical relationship with final demand would warrant, as a 
result of the incipient import substitution process prompted by the 
competitiveness gains achieved.
As is commonly the case during the expansionary phases of the 
Spanish economy, employment growth is set to remain closely 
pegged to growth in economic activity. The rapid pace of job 
growth will push down the unemployment rate further, although it 
will remain well above pre-crisis levels, at around 11% at the end 
of the projection horizon. This high level of unemployment is one 
of the factors constraining wage growth, although wages are 
expected to pick up over the next three years as the slack in the 
labour market decreases. Given that a parallel rise in productivity 
is not anticipated, this will push up unit labour costs. However, the 
rise in ULCs will be less than the ECB projects for the euro area as 
a whole, so the increase will still be compatible with continuing 
competitiveness gains relative to the euro area.
The Spanish economy will maintain its net lending position vis-à-
vis the rest of the world, although it will be a few tenths of a percent 
lower than estimated for 2017 (when it stood at 1.9% of GDP). In 
particular, the goods and services surplus will remain around 
2.7%, driven by two opposing forces: improved net trade flows in 
real terms and the deterioration in terms of trade. However, the 
rising interest rates foreseen in the external assumptions point to 
a slight worsening of the income balance.
On the consumer prices front, current projections envisage core 
inflation accelerating gradually from its current low levels. 
Forecast GDP growth over the projection horizon outpaces the 
existing estimates of the rate of growth of potential output. 
Therefore, the positive output gap that emerged, on our estimates, 
at the end of 2017 will tend to widen over the next three years, 
which is likely to drive up domestic inflationary pressures. Profit 
margins are expected to stabilise after the cumulative gains made 
in recent years. After a sharp increase in 2017, on the back of 
rapidly rising prices of oil and other commodities, external 
inflationary pressures will tend to moderate at the start of the 
projection horizon, thanks to the recent appreciation of the euro. 
However, they are likely to pick up again further down the line, 
given the expected gradual increase in global inflationary 
pressures while the slack in the global economy is gradually 
absorbed. Consequently, the CPI is projected to rise by 1.2% this 
year, following a path largely determined by the energy component 
which, on current oil-price assumptions, is likely to head up over 
the coming months to reach a peak in the summer before 
subsequently slackening off. For the next two years, the CPI is 
forecast to rise by 1.4% in 2019 and 1.7% in 2020.
The risks to the baseline economic growth scenario are mainly on 
the upside in the near term, as ongoing revisions to the projections 
for the global economy suggest that its expansionary momentum 
may be underestimated. By contrast, towards the end of the 
projection horizon, the risks are likely to be on the downside. On 
the domestic front, current projections assume that the decline in 
political uncertainty regarding the situation in Catalonia observed 
since the December projections will continue going forward. 
However, a resurgence of tension cannot be ruled out, with the 
consequent negative impact on the economy, particularly in 
Catalonia itself. Moreover, some recent announcements suggest a 
possible easing of budgetary consolidation efforts, beyond those 
already included in the baseline scenario. Although this would 
have expansionary effects in the short term, over a longer horizon 
it would exacerbate the economy’s vulnerability to adverse shocks, 
given the high level of public debt and the need to undertake 
significant public debt reduction over the medium term. In the 
opposite direction, the baseline scenario includes the assumption 
of a partial recovery in the household saving rate, particularly after 
the sharp drop in 2017. However, the upturn in this variable may 
be less pronounced, leading to faster household consumption 
growth, and thus higher GDP growth.
On the external front, the new grand coalition agreement in 
Germany could give rise to a more expansionary budgetary policy 
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in that country, which in the near term could boost the rate of 
growth in the euro area as a whole. However, the tensions in 
financial markets seen in early February suggest that the process 
of monetary policy normalisation in the advanced economies, and 
especially in the United States, is not without its uncertainties. In 
particular, an unexpectedly severe intensification of inflationary 
pressures could trigger fresh bouts of abrupt price corrections in 
financial markets. In this connection, the recent adoption of fiscal 
expansion plans in the United States has heightened these risks, 
as it has taken place in an economy with a very high degree of 
capacity utilisation. Other causes of uncertainty include, first, the 
possibility that the decision by the United States to impose tariffs 
on imports of steel and aluminium may trigger a spiral of similar 
measures by the authorities in other countries, with the attendant 
adverse effects on world trade. Second, various sources of 
geopolitical tension persist, including in Europe the continuing 
lack of clarity about the shape the future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom will ultimately take and 
the uncertainty surrounding the formation of a government in Italy, 
following the outcome of the last election.
The risks to prices appear to be balanced. The downside risks 
described above for the global economy also represent downside 
risks for the external component of inflation. Moreover, as noted, 
the projections rely on the assumption that wages and prices will 
respond to the reduction in the degree of slack to a greater extent 
than they have done since the start of the expansionary phase – a 
hypothesis that may fail to materialise.  Nevertheless, the existence 
of non-linear effects in the relationship between economic activity 
and prices cannot be ruled out, such that after a certain point is 
passed, the reduction in cyclical slack starts to have ever larger 
inflationary impacts. Furthermore, the synchronisation of strong 
global economic growth suggests possible upward pressures on 
commodity prices. However, in the specific case of oil, these 
pressures would be offset by the fact that they would make a 
larger number of unconventional oil sources economically viable.
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2018‑2020) (cont’d)
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BOX 2 THE CHANGE IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY STANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
The economic recovery is allowing monetary policy normalisation 
to be initiated in some of the main advanced economies after 
nearly 10 years of monetary stimulus. This applies particularly to 
the United States. In December 2015 the Federal Reserve 
commenced, with a 0.25 pp increment, a gradual process of 
official interest rate rises, with another increase in 2016 and three 
more in 2017, initiating the process of balance sheet reduction in 
October of that same year. Other central banks have not made so 
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BOX 2 
much progress in withdrawing monetary stimuli, although the 
Bank of England raised its reference rate in November, and even 
the ECB and, to a lesser extent, the Bank of Japan are already 
beginning to define their exit strategy. In particular, the Federal 
Reserve faces major dilemmas in this process, since the output 
gap of the US economy is positive and the degree of slack in its 
labour market is very small, but the prevailing rate of inflation 
continues to be very moderate. Furthermore, should there be a 
greater-than-expected tightening of monetary policy stance, some 
markets could be exposed to a significant correction, as evidenced 
by the turmoil in February 2018.
To this should be added a fiscal policy which has adopted a 
markedly expansionary slant in recent months with the approval of 
a fiscal reform in late December and a bipartisan agreement in early 
February which raises the expenditure ceiling by $296 billion in 
fiscal years 2018 and 2019.1 The tax reform includes most notably 
a corporate income tax cut from 35% to 21% and the immediate 
deduction of 100% of expenses arising from investment — which 
will be temporary — as well as other measures affecting taxation of 
multinationals’ profits generated abroad. The reform also introduces 
changes to the direct taxation of households which will reduce their 
tax burden at all income levels between 2018 and 2025.
In principle, the procyclicality of these tax measures may contribute 
to an overheating of the economy, leading to inflation above the 
central bank target which may eventually require interest rates to 
be raised more rapidly than anticipated. To illustrate this, the 
results of a NiGEM model simulation of the effect of expansionary 
fiscal policy (with and without a monetary policy response) are 
analysed below for the USA and other economies.
In the first simulated scenario, monetary policy does not respond 
to the effects of the fiscal stimulus, so that the interest rate follows 
the course currently expected by the Federal Reserve. The impact 
of the fiscal expansion on the level of GDP exceeds 1.5 pp in the 
period 2018-2021 and drops to 0.5 pp towards the end of the 
forecasting horizon, between 2023 and 2027 (see Chart 1). Inflation 
increases more than expected under the baseline scenario 
between the years 2018-2022 (see Chart 2). Additionally, it is 
important to take into account that the expansionary measures will 
contribute to raising the path of the government deficit by nearly 1 
pp of GDP in the next decade, which is all the more significant in a 
situation of high government debt (see Chart 3). According to the 
model, aggregate demand and, consequently, imports would 
increase more rapidly than exports, which would worsen the 
external deficit by 0.4 pp as a percentage of GDP with respect to 
the scenario without fiscal stimulus.
Under the second scenario, monetary policy is allowed to respond 
to the effect that the fiscal stimulus has on the output gap and 
inflation. And under the third scenario, in addition to this 
endogenous response of monetary policy, it is assumed that the 
term premium increases by 75 bp, thus returning to its average 
historical level. Under these two scenarios, short-term interest 
rates increase above the trend currently expected by the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) to a lesser extent than in the 
aforementioned case, since the increase in the term premium 
implies that financial conditions tighten. This response of monetary 
policy causes both GDP and inflation to increase to a lesser extent 
than under the initial scenario (see Charts 4 and 5). 
Regarding the effects on other areas, under the exogenous 
monetary policy scenario, the GDP of China, Japan and the United 
Kingdom would rise by around 0.5 pp at end-2019 with respect to 
the baseline scenario due to higher demand for their exports by the 
United States (see Chart 6). In the euro area, the impact would be 
somewhat less (0.35 pp). Under a scenario with a monetary policy 
response, the effects would be lower, between 0.1 pp and 0.2 pp in 
China, the euro area and Japan, and would even be negative in the 
United Kingdom (-0.1 pp with respect to the baseline scenario). 
Furthermore, the US term premium may spread to the other 
countries in view of this economy’s central position in the global 
financial markets, with the attendant contractionary effects on the 
GDP of the rest of the world. In some countries, this financial 
channel may outweigh the commercial channel referred to above.
In short, the fiscal expansion will foreseeably contribute to greater 
dynamism of the US economy in the short term, even if the Federal 
Reserve responds by stepping up the pace of monetary policy 
normalisation against a background marked by a positive output 
gap and growing inflation. However, this baseline scenario of 
higher short-term growth in activity is accompanied, in a medium-
term horizon, by an increase in the risks associated with worsening 
public finances and with a widening current-account deficit. The 
international impact of this fiscal expansion will foreseeably be 
modest and even negative if there is a contagion effect in the 
financial markets of other countries, particularly if the US 
authorities decide to introduce protection measures to counteract 
the worsening US external balance.
THE CHANGE IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY STANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (cont’d)
1  In addition, in February President Trump unveiled an infrastructure 
improvement plan for $200 billion in 10 years, which could foreseeably 
generate total investment of at least $1.5 billion by fostering the 
investment of state and local governments and of private firms. However, 
this plan is currently at the initial discussion stage and its approval is 
expected to be complicated.
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BOX 3 GLOBAL STOCK MARKET CORRECTION AND VOLATILITY EPISODE
Between 1 and 8 February 2018, the US S&P 500 Index fell by 8.5%. 
The fall was concentrated in two days’ trading – 2 and 5 February – 
with the biggest correction since 2011 recorded on 5 February. In 
addition, implied volatility rose significantly, after a lengthy period at 
historically low levels (see Chart 1). Subsequently, stock prices have 
tended to recover and volatility has moderated, although neither 
have returned to the levels recorded before the market turmoil.
Various reports prepared by international organisations, such as 
the IMF and the ECB and the Banco de España,1 had warned of 
the risk of a sharp correction in equity prices, particularly in the 
United States. One supporting factor for that view was the strong 
appreciation of the US stock market in recent years (see Chart 2). 
Thus, between January 2012 and January 2018, the S&P  500 
Index gained 125%, compared with 72% for the EUROSTOXX 50 
Index and 35% for the FTSE 100. As a result, in the United States, 
some of the metrics generally used to measure share prices had 
moved some distance from their historical median, prompting 
concern among investors that shares were possibly overvalued 
(see Chart 3).
In this setting, one catalyst of the stock market correction in the 
United States was the publication, on 2 February, of figures that 
showed an unexpected increase in wage growth in the country in 1  See Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, November 2017.
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters, Robert Shiller and Banco de España.
a Average 3-month USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD volatility.
b Metrics obtained since January 2005, taking the median of the distribution, represented by the horizontal line between the blue and red areas, as 100. The upper 
and lower limits of both areas correspond to the 75th and 25th percentiles. The end of the lines represent the minimum and maximum of the distribution. The green 
rhombi show the current levels. Last observation: 7 March 2018. Risk premium is calculated by subtracting the corresponding 10-year inflation-indexed bond yield 
from the real cost of capital of each index, obtained using a dividend discount model. Dividend yield is the dividend of the past year of index firms as a percentage 
of index capitalisation. CAPE ratio is the cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratio. The lower the green rhombus value, the higher the overvaluation in the case of risk 
premium and dividend yield, whereas for the CAPE ratio, the higher the rhombus value the higher the overvaluation.
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BOX 3 GLOBAL STOCK MARKET CORRECTION AND VOLATILITY EPISODE (cont’d)
January (2.9% year-on-year), while unemployment was at its lowest 
levels since 2000. This unexpected wage growth was interpreted as 
a sign that inflation could be heading up and, therefore, that official 
interest rates could rise faster than was previously expected. 
Indeed, the likelihood of rates rising by 75 basis points (bp) in 2018 
had already increased, even before the employment figures 
were published. The expectation that official interest rates would 
rise was also reflected in the increase of more than 30 bp in US 
10-year sovereign bond yields in January, up to 2.85%. These 
higher sovereign yields could have prompted some investors to 
favour debt securities over equities.
There are signs that this episode of stock price correction and 
heightened volatility may have been amplified by certain market 
practices. Particularly noteworthy was the surge of 177% in 
implied volatility (in terms of the VIX Index) in just two sessions, to 
levels not seen since 2012; this was extraordinarily strong given 
the scale of the decline in share prices (see Chart 1). Exchange-
traded products (ETPs) which replicate the VIX may have 
contributed to this sharp increase. Although ETPs are moderate in 
size in aggregate terms, some of their trading practices can have 
a significant impact on price formation. Thus, given the initial 
surges in volatility at the start of the trading session on 5 February, 
investors knew that ETPs would have to buy more VIX futures, 
either to be able to replicate the index or, in the case of those that 
had wagered on low volatility, to limit their losses. Accordingly, in 
anticipation of these rebalancing effects, some market participants 
may have positioned themselves to benefit from increases in the 
VIX, triggering a more pronounced climb in this indicator as the 
session neared its close. Such strategies may in turn have caused 
a contagion effect on the spot market, owing to trading practices 
based on the negative correlation between prices on the VIX Index 
and the underlying share index. Moreover, the fall in share prices 
could also have been amplified by arbitrage strategies conducted 
by certain hedge funds, seeking to exploit the close correlation 
between the VIX and the underlying shares and derivatives. Lastly, 
the fact that several lower levels of support based on moving 
averages were crossed may have triggered sale orders in some 
algorithm-based trading systems.
The fall in share prices on the US markets spread to other stock 
markets around the world, mainly the Asian and European markets. 
Thus, between 1 and 9 February, the euro area’s EUROSTOXX 50, 
the United Kingdom’s FTSE  100 and Spain’s IBEX  35 all fell by 
around 7%. The VSTOXX, the implied volatility index associated with 
the EUROSTOXX 50, also rose significantly, albeit more moderately 
than its US counterpart (see Chart 1). The correction occurred even 
though, in comparison with the United States, there was less 
concern that European markets could be overvalued; this is shown 
in the metrics generally used to measure share prices, which were 
close to their historical medians (see Chart  3). In any event, this 
episode demonstrates that even if European markets are not 
apparently overvalued, on the metrics analysed in this box, this does 
not protect them from stress episodes in the US markets. In the 
weeks following, share price volatility on the European markets 
tended to return to normal, although without reaching the levels seen 
before the episode in February, and stock market indexes have 
recovered slightly, albeit less so than in the United States.
Bond markets were hardly affected by the stock market turmoil 
(see Chart 4). Thus, in Europe and in the United States, corporate 
bond spreads over the corresponding sovereign bonds were 
virtually unchanged in the period. In the euro area, sovereign 
spreads widened only slightly in the first week of February. 
Likewise, bonds and exchange rates did not experience the sharp 
surge in volatility observed in the stock market indexes (see 
Chart  1). This would be consistent with the argument that the 
technical elements mentioned above played a major part in the 
stock market correction, over and above the effect associated 
with fundamentals.
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The US dollar exchange rate has experienced strong and fairly 
widespread depreciation vis-à-vis other currencies since early 
2017, following a period that began in 2014, in which the dollar 
appreciated notably in a context in which the economic recovery 
and, therefore, the normalisation of monetary policy, was at a 
more advanced stage in the United States than in other 
economies. As shown in Chart 1, the nominal effective exchange 
rate of the dollar appreciated by 25% between early 2014 and the 
end of 2016, subsequently depreciating by around 10% in 
effective terms. This depreciation was particularly pronounced 
against the euro (18%).
The behaviour of the dollar may seem somewhat surprising 
considering that the short-term economic outlook in the United 
States has gradually improved, especially after the approval of tax 
reform and the increase in public spending, and that the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary normalisation process continues to be 
comparatively more advanced. Indeed, the short-term interest rate 
spreads vis-à-vis other areas – normally associated with exchange-
rate appreciation given that capital usually flows to areas where 
returns are higher for a certain level of risk – have tended to 
increase (see Chart 2). Nevertheless, from a financial standpoint, a 
possible explanation of the recent depreciation of the dollar could 
be that, since the United States is further ahead with the withdrawal 
of monetary stimuli – to a large extent already discounted by the 
markets – it is to be expected that in the future it will be other areas 
that will normalise their monetary policies, such as the euro area, 
which would be reflected in a widening in their favour of the 
interest rate spreads at the intermediate maturities of the curve. 
This would be corroborated by developments in the difference in 
the spread between the two- and five-year rates in Germany, on 
one hand, and in the United States, on the other. This difference 
has shown, in the past year, a high correlation with the path of the 
euro-dollar exchange rate, as show in the same chart.
An alternative explanation of the widespread depreciation of the 
dollar in the past year may be the fact that the economic outlook 
has improved not only in the United States, but more globally, and 
thus, in a favourable global financial environment, the appetite for 
risk and the search for returns in other markets has continued, 
contributing to the appreciation of other currencies. As Chart 3 
shows, in the past year GDP growth projections for 2017 and 2018 
in the euro area, for example, were revised upwards to a higher 
degree than those of the United States, which may have favoured 
a further appreciation of the euro. 
However, aside from the temporary factors, there are other, more 
structural, determinants that would explain the depreciating trend 
of the dollar. For instance, the sizeable external imbalance in the 
US economy, with a persistently high current account deficit 
which, having peaked at around 6% of GDP in the years before the 
crisis, has remained above 2.5% of GDP in recent years (see Chart 
4), contrasting with the current account surpluses recorded in 
other areas. According to the IMF’s most recent analysis of the 
global external imbalances (published in the External Sector 
Report, July 2017), in 2016, the United States ran an excess 
external deficit of around two percentage points of GDP, and the 
dollar was overvalued by between 10% and 15%, and therefore, 
the depreciation observed in 2017 would be part of the adjustment 
required to correct the imbalance vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
The fiscal stimulus measures that the United States is implementing 
will have a positive effect on economic activity and prices in the 
short term, and this could lead to higher-than-expected interest 
rate rises, triggering appreciation pressures on the dollar. However, 
it is very likely that the fiscal and external imbalances in the US 
economy will worsen, given its diminished cyclical slack (see 
Charts 4 and 5)1. In this context, the protectionist measures 
adopted by the US government to keep the external deficit in 
check may lead to the appreciation of the dollar, but in the medium 
term, they may give rise to a trade confrontation that would 
exacerbate the external imbalance of the United States and 
reinforce the depreciation pressures on the dollar.
Indeed, the historical evidence of recent decades shows that the 
emergence in the United States of high budget and current 
account deficits (known as “twin deficits”) has been associated 
with strong depreciation of the dollar, as occurred in the mid-
1980s with the expansionary fiscal policies of the Reagan 
administration and in the early 2000s following several tax cuts, as 
shown in Chart 6. In both cases, the increase in the external deficit 
of the US economy, triggered by a higher budget deficit, was 
followed by a substantial depreciation of the nominal effective 
exchange rate of the dollar of 35% between 1985-88 and 30% 
between 2002-2007. In the latter period, the introduction of tariffs 
in the United States was also accompanied by dollar depreciation.
BOX 4 THE DEPRECIATION OF THE DOLLAR SINCE EARLY 2017
1  According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates of June 
2017, the projected public debt (held by the public) would increase from 
the current 77% of GDP to 91% in 2027, before taking into account the 
effects of tax reform. Although it has not yet published the new 
projections which include these effects and the recently approved 
increase in spending, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget 
estimates that, as a result of tax reform, the debt will increase to 97% of 
GDP in 2027 and up to 99%, taking into account the rise in spending in 
2018-19. Should the rise in spending and the tax cuts, which are 
temporary (such as those relating to personal income tax) become 
permanent, something that cannot be ruled out, the ratio of debt held by 
the public would increase to almost 110% of GDP within 10 years.
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BOX 4 THE DEPRECIATION OF THE DOLLAR SINCE EARLY 2017 (cont’d)
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a Assuming exogenous monetary policy.
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After years of scant headway in the ongoing reform of the 
institutional framework underpinning the single currency, the 
economic recovery and the current political outlook open a 
window of opportunity for progress towards the design of a more 
complete Economic and Monetary Union better equipped to 
absorb adverse shocks. The European Commission has taken the 
initiative in this respect and, on the basis of the 2015 Five 
Presidents’ Report, it has tabled specific proposals for possible 
approval in the course of this year and early 2019,1 before the 
current parliamentary legislature concludes, while other elements 
should be defined between 2020 and 2025 (see accompanying 
table).2 At the same time, some alternatives have also been 
suggested in political and academic circles.3 This box sets out the 
main elements under debate. 
Banking and Financial Union 
The weaknesses of banking systems and the force of the financial 
fragmentation processes that emerged during the recent crisis, 
along with evidence that in more complete monetary unions it is 
the private channels operating through financial markets that 
enable a greater proportion of risks to be shared4, led the euro 
area governance reform agenda to place the initial emphasis on 
the need to complete the banking and financial union. Accordingly, 
notable progress has been made in the banking arena, through the 
creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism. But certain elements that are vital for 
preventing a climate of mistrust such as that experienced in the 
past from taking hold in future crises have yet to be set in place. 
Such elements include most notably the need to create a common 
backstop (or lender of last resort) for the Single Resolution Fund, 
should this Fund’s resources not prove sufficient to tackle potential 
banking crises. In this connection, there is some political 
consensus on the EC’s December 2017 proposal, which considers 
that it is the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that should 
assume these functions, although possible arrangements and 
significant technical aspects are still under discussion. 
There is less consensus, however, on the design of a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which the EC suggests be 
approved in the course of 2018. The major discrepancies focus 
on the degree to which risks would be shared at the end of the 
launch process, since set against the EC’s initial proposal (2015)5, 
which contemplated a full pooling of risks, other less ambitious 
alternatives suggest a model based on national insurance 
schemes, which would co-exist with an EDIS and would absorb 
the initial losses where necessary. Another essential element of 
the discussion is financing; while there is agreement that this 
should be through bank contributions weighted by such banks’ 
risks, it has also been suggested that there should be 
differentiation based on national considerations to take into 
account the quality of the regulatory framework or the probability 
of one bank’s problems ultimately spreading to others (CEPR, 
2018). Lastly, some believe the creation of the EDIS should be 
conditional upon a prior reduction of European banks’ exposure 
to sovereign debt. 
Turning to the Capital Markets Union, the EC plans to set in train 
various initiatives before 2019 which, in principle, will not arouse 
major controversy. The aim here is to bring about a greater 
development and integration of European capital markets with 
various objectives in mind: to diversify sources of financing (including 
through the promotion of private equity funds), to strengthen 
investment in infrastructures, to enhance corporate bond market 
oversight and to improve access by small and medium-sized 
enterprises to funding.
Lastly, the conclusions reached by a High-Level Task Force of the 
European Systemic Risk Board6 help highlight the advantages 
associated with the creation of securities backed by a diversified 
portfolio comprising sovereign debt of the euro area countries 
(Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities – SBBS). Unlike Eurobonds, 
these securities do not entail the joint liability of governments, but 
they would enable bank debt portfolios to be diversified and 
thereby weaken the link between this and sovereign debt. 
Nonetheless, the report also reveals the difficulties posed by their 
creation in the current regulatory framework. The EC will table a 
proposal for the creation of SBBS in spring 2018, postponing until 
later the debate on the possibility of introducing European public 
debt with joint and several liability. 
Economic and Fiscal Union 
As regards the Economic and Fiscal Union, the need is raised 
once again to strike a balance between reducing risks and creating 
risk-pooling mechanisms. In the former case, the EC intends to 
duplicate between 2018 and 2020 the structural reform support 
BOX 5 THE DEBATE ON EURO AREA GOVERNANCE REFORM
1  The European Council at the end of June 2018 is expected to arrive at 
specific commitments in this respect.
2  See the “Reflection paper on the deepening of the economic and 
monetary union (EC, 2017); the Communication from the EC on 
“Completing the Banking Union (2017) and the December 2017 package 
[which contains a legislative proposal to transform the ESM into the 
European Monetary Fund or EMF, a communication on new budgetary 
instruments for the stability of the euro area within the European Union, 
a communication on the possible functions of a Minister of Economy 
and Finance, and a legislative proposal to include the so-called Fiscal 
Compact in the European legal framework (https://ec.europa.eu/info/
publications/economy-finance/completing-europes-economic-and-
monetary-union-policy-package_en)].
3  See, for example, the German non-paper for paving the way towards a 
Stability Union (2017), which takes up the position of the previous German 
government and, in the academic arena, CEPR(2018), “Reconciling risk 
sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform”, 
Policy Insight 91, http://bruegel.org/2018/01/reconciling-risk-sharing-with-
market-discipline-a-constructive-approach-to-euro-area-reform/.
4  On risk-sharing mechanisms in the euro area and in the United States, 
see Chapter 4, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
5  CE (2015), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, 
COM 2015/0586. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= 
CELEX%3A52015PC0586.
6  Report of the “High-level Task force on Safe Assets”, 2018, European 
Systemic Risk Board.
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programme already in place for EU Member States, reinforcing it 
as from 2020, when the new EU budgetary framework is agreed. 
It is also intended to strengthen and simplify the European fiscal 
framework, to promote fulfilment of the rules and to generate 
sufficient leeway so as to deploy countercyclical fiscal policies in the 
face of adverse shocks. In this connection, the EC made a proposal 
in December to integrate the main elements of the Fiscal Compact 
into European legislation7 and to improve the medium-term fiscal 
policy stance by establishing a commitment regarding the path of 
expenditure. However, simplifying the complex framework of rules 
comprising the current European fiscal arrangements, whose 
practical implementation is difficult, has been left till later. 
All told, the difficulties entailed in coordinating common fiscal policy 
measures in severe crises, when the national stabilisers prove 
insufficient and monetary policy is constrained by the existence of an 
effective bound on the scope for interest rate cuts, mean that it might 
be advisable to introduce supranational fiscal mechanisms that 
contribute to increasing the shock-absorbing effectiveness of 
economic policies. In this respect, the recent literature considers 
various alternatives for moving towards such European fiscal 
capacity. The most ambitious proposals suggest creating a European 
BOX 5 THE DEBATE ON EURO AREA GOVERNANCE REFORM (cont’d)
EC initiatives to complete EMU Possible calendar
Financial union
    Banking union
        Backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) through the ESM/EMF
        European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)
        Reduction of risks
        Regulatory treatment of bank sovereign exposure
Mutual understanding mid-2018, 
coming into force in 2020-2025
    Capital Markets Union and safe assets
        Various initiatives (European supervisory authorities, regulation 
        of market infrastructures…)
Finalise legislation pending before mid-2019
        European Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities —no common liability—, 
        under study by the ESRB
EC proposal in spring 2018
        Safe asset —common liability—
Mutual understanding by mid-2018, 
coming into force in 2020-2025
Economic and fiscal union
    Structural Reform support instrument
    Specific convergence facility for non-euro area countries
    Common stabilisation function for investment in the event of asymmetric shocks
    Reinforcement of the Structural Reform Support Programme to 2020 
    (technical assistance for reforms and convergence by non-euro area countries)
    Change in European structural and investment funds so that countries 
    use reserve funds until 2020
    Simplification of the Stability and Growth Pact
Mutual understanding mid-2018, 
coming into force in 2020-2025
Political union
        Fiscal Compact Into Union law (including flexibility criteria)
        European Monetary Fund (EMF) as a successor to the ESM
        Minister of Economy and Finance Political discussion
        European Treasury
Mutual understanding mid-2018, 
coming into force in 2020-2025
Approval before mid-2019
Approval in 2018
Approval in 2018
EC proposal in May 2018 for approval 
before mid-2019. All as part of new multi-year 
financial framework, 2020-2025 
SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España.
7  This agreement was introduced in 2013 to respond to the need to 
strengthen the European fiscal framework with national rules and to 
reinforce the synergies between the rules and national independent 
institutions. Its main elements include most notably the obligation to 
incorporate the balanced-budget commitment into national legislation. 
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budget with functions geared to macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
funding of common expenditure (on defence and security) and 
revenue-raising and debt-issuance capacity.8 Others consider 
establishing a new ESM credit line that can extend low-cost loans to 
countries facing particularly adverse cyclical circumstances. 
The EC’s December proposal considers the creation of a 
stabilisation function or a function for the safeguarding of public 
investment against asymmetric shocks. Although the instrument is 
not fully defined, the aim would be to prevent – through loans and 
subsidies charged to the EU budget – public investment from 
being the first victim of periods of economic slowdown. While it is 
a positive initiative, we should not lose sight of the potential 
advantages of alternative instruments, such as cyclical insurance 
funds or unemployment insurance arrangements; although they 
elicit greater controversy, these instruments enable a greater 
cyclical stabilisation capacity to be attained with a limited volume 
of resources.9
Finally, on the institutional front there is some consensus on transforming 
the ESM into a European Monetary Fund. This institution would assume 
greater responsibilities for overseeing the economic policies of countries 
that need financial assistance and would act as a lender of last resort to 
the Single Resolution Fund. Some proposals suggest that the future 
ESM should assume the economic policy oversight and coordination 
functions that the Treaty assigns to the European Commission, to 
strengthen the capacity to prevent future crises; but it seems the best 
way forward would involve cooperation between both institutions. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect, however, is whether financial 
assistance from this institution should be conditional or not upon the 
automatic restructuring of debt, as the German proposal suggests and 
as the CEPR (2018) less categorically intimates.  In this respect, the 
ESM itself has voiced its opposition to automatic mechanisms given 
the complexity of discerning in real time whether the country is facing 
liquidity or debt-sustainability problems and in light of the impact that 
the possibility of restructuring may have on financing costs. 
BOX 5 THE DEBATE ON EURO AREA GOVERNANCE REFORM (cont’d)
8  See, for example, the article by several European economists, academics 
and former heads of European institutions, “Blueprint for a democratic 
renewal of the Eurozone”, published in Político on 28 February 2018. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/opinion-blueprint-for-a-democratic-
renewal-of-the-eurozone/ 9  See Chapter 4, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
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Knowing the Spanish economy’s position in the economic cycle is 
essential when evaluating the stance of the various economic 
policies that have been implemented or when performing a 
diagnosis of the possible emergence of inflationary pressure. For 
example, in the case of budgetary policy, in order to assess fiscal 
drive, the structural component of the budget deficit needs to be 
calculated which requires knowing the size of the output gap. The 
output gap1 is defined as the difference between actual and 
potential GDP. Potential GDP is usually defined as the result of full 
utilisation of available capacity – labour force and installed capital 
stock – and which is consistent with the absence of inflationary 
pressure. Thus, for instance, following several years of below-
potential GDP growth, this gap would be negative, as corresponds 
to a situation with idle productive resources. By contrast, after 
several years of above-potential GDP growth, a positive gap 
would be achieved, namely, a situation of over-utilisation of 
productive capacity which would lead to inflationary pressure.
Potential output, however, cannot be observed and, consequently, 
it has to be estimated and that estimate, particularly in real time, is 
subject to high uncertainty and should therefore be interpreted 
with due caution. Basically, there are two ways of estimating an 
economy’s potential output: those which use statistical procedures 
to discount cyclical factors and those based on the use of a 
production function. The main advantage of the latter is that they 
analyse sources of economic growth2.
According to the estimates of the Banco de España, the potential 
output growth of the Spanish economy is expected to be 
recovering from the low reached in 2013 as a result of the economic 
crisis which chiefly reflected the strong slowdown on the 
employment side (see Chart  1). This gradual recovery is 
underpinned by a slightly more positive performance, in relation to 
other growth periods, of productivity3 and by a less negative 
contribution from employment, supported by the fall in structural 
unemployment, which partially offsets the negative impact of the 
ageing population and the sluggish labour market participation. 
Similarly, capital accumulation seems to have shown a somewhat 
more favourable profile in recent years.
In terms of cyclical position, available estimates suggest that the 
recovery of potential growth in recent years will have been 
notably lower than the vigour observed in GDP and, consequently, 
the pronounced negative output gap which arose during the 
recessionary phase of the crisis will have narrowed relatively 
rapidly in recent years to very close to zero – albeit still in negative 
territory – in 2017 (see Chart  2). This pattern is expected to 
continue over the next few years giving rise to positive, increasing 
gaps until 2020. Broadly speaking, taking into account the 
uncertainty surrounding these estimates, these results are 
consistent with those obtained by other organisations which 
concur that the negative output gap that built up during the years 
of crisis should close in 2018, or, at the very latest, in 20194.
Chart 3 shows the relationship between the unemployment gap 
(difference between the unemployment rate and structural 
unemployment) and wage growth in the market economy which, as 
can be seen, is negative in the sense that negative unemployment 
gaps are related to higher wage increases. Similarly, Chart 4 shows 
how the correlation between the output gap and underlying inflation 
(measured by the CPI excluding the more volatile components of 
energy and unprocessed food prices) is positive. Nevertheless, the 
two relationships are far from perfect; thus, individual data may be 
significantly far removed from the regression line showing the 
historical average. In particular, in the last two years, wage growth 
and underlying inflation are estimated to have been slightly lower 
than would be determined by the historical relationship with the 
unemployment gap and the output gap, respectively. For the 
forecast period, a gradual approximation to these two historical 
relationships is projected, on the basis of the existence of certain 
evidence that the relationship between inflation of prices and 
wages, on one hand, and the cyclical position, on the other, is not 
linear with the result that it is closer in deep recessions and strong 
upturns5. In any event, the materialisation of this approximation is 
subject to significant uncertainty.
BOX 6 CYCLICAL POSITION OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
1  In order to measure an economy’s position in the cycle, other variables 
can be used such as the unemployment rate which, in turn, can be 
measured using several alternatives (see Box 6 of the Quarterly Report 
of the Banco de España 2/2017 “Alternative measures of unemployment 
for the Spanish economy”). In this case, the equivalent to the production 
gap would be the NAIRU gap, which measures the difference between 
the unemployment rate (or labour market slack) observed and the rate 
consistent with a situation free from inflationary pressure.
2  The methodology used at the Banco de España to estimate potential 
output is based on the production function. See in this respect, 
Cuadrado, P. and E. Moral-Benito (2016) “Potential growth of the 
Spanish economy”, Occasional Paper, 1603.
3  That is a consequence of the far-reaching process of reallocation of 
resources towards more efficient firms observed in the Spanish economy 
during the crisis which seems to have continued without interruption 
afterwards.
4  A comparison with other estimates for the Spanish economy (made by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the OECD, the IMF, the European 
Commission and the ECB) shows a similar pattern of gradual recovery of 
the cyclical position from the lows of 2013 and, in most cases, the gap 
turns positive in 2018.
5  See in this respect, Cuadrado, P. and E. Moral-Benito (2016) “Thresholds 
in the relationship between inflation and economic activity”, Economic 
Bulletin, Banco de España, 12/2016.
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BOX 6 CYCLICAL POSITION OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Rates of change.
b Output gap defined as the percentage difference between the level of actual and potential GDP, in relation to potential GDP.
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One of the factors contributing to the strong adjustment in the 
current account balance of the Spanish economy since 2008 has 
been the increasingly positive contribution of net non-tourism services 
(also referred to here as “Other services”).1 This box aims to offer a 
detailed analysis of the factors underlying the structural change taking 
place in trends in imports and exports of these services.
For this purpose, the disaggregated data available from the balance 
of payments published by the Banco de España allows the sectors 
and geographical destinations making the biggest contributions to 
the strength of these flows to be identified.2 The non-tourism services 
heading of the balance of payments mainly draws upon the Survey 
on International Trade in Services (Encuesta de Comercio Internacional 
de Servicios – ECIS – in Spanish), published quarterly by the National 
Statistics Institute and based on a representative sample of 7,975 units 
(companies and other entities) registered as being resident in 
Spain. The survey records transactions between Spanish-resident 
units and those resident elsewhere in the world at market prices 
at the time the service was provided or received.3
Despite the drop in sales of financial and construction services to 
the rest of the world caused by the recession, exports of non-
tourism services grew strongly, in line with trends in goods and 
tourism, with the pace of growth even accelerating in recent years. 
According to Banco de España data, nominal exports of Other 
services grew by an average of 3.3% a year between 2008 and 
2016, compared with 3.5% for goods and 2.9% for tourism, thus 
exceeding the latter’s share since 2008 and representing 16% of 
total trade in 2016. Meanwhile, imports of most items under the 
heading of Other services have stagnated since 2008. As a result 
of these trends in the two types of flows, the persistent deficits 
observed during the expansionary phase gave way to sustained 
surpluses during the crisis, which widened further as the recovery 
began to take hold in 2014 (see Chart 1).
This performance of the trade in non-tourism services is set in a 
context characterised by technological advances facilitating the 
international trade in services, and a long-term process in which 
advanced economies are becoming increasingly services based. 
Therefore, between 2008 and 2016, the share of non-tourism 
services in world trade rose by almost 3 pp to 18%. Other developed 
countries that underwent positive growth of the external balance of 
non-tourism services between 2008 and 2016 include the United 
Kingdom and the United States. However, in France, Italy and 
Germany the balance remained relatively constant, even deteriorating 
in some cases (see Chart 1). Broadly, relative to other countries, the 
positive trend in Spain’s exports has been concentrated in other 
business services whereas, from the international viewpoint, the 
stagnation of imports has mainly been due to slower imports of 
financial services and other business services (see Chart 3).
At the more detailed level, Spain’s exports of transport services 
and other business services accounted for approximately 60% of 
income in 2016. Nevertheless, the relative importance of these two 
headings followed divergent paths over the period 2008-2016: the 
share of transport services dropped by 6 pp to around 24% of the 
total, while the share of other business services rose by slightly 
more than 8 pp to account for close to 36% of income. For their 
part, although exports of telecommunications, computer and 
information services grew, their share declined by 2 pp to 18%. 
Services relating to insurance and pensions and charges for the 
use of intellectual property also grew strongly, although they 
continue to represent a small share. By contrast, the share of 
construction and financial services exports dropped by almost 
6 pp to around 8% (see Chart 4).
Other business services have played a fundamental role in the 
progress of exports in recent years, explaining almost two thirds of 
the rise in income from non-tourism services since 2008. This is 
mainly due to income growth among engineering and consulting 
firms (which grew by an average of 8.2% and 17.6%, respectively, 
from 2008-2016) to account for 27% and 8%, respectively, of 
other business services, although the strong performance of 
advertising and market research services, which grew by 5.1% a 
year to 11% of the total, also contributed (see Chart 5).4 It should 
be noted that these other business services grew against the 
background of a decline in domestic demand, particularly in the 
case of civil engineering, forcing Spanish companies to increase 
their sales in external markets.
As regards the destination of Spain’s exports, it is worth noting 
that the increase in exports of non-tourism services was 
accompanied by a degree of geographical diversification, with a 
strong increase in the presence of Spanish companies in the 
countries of Asia and Latin America, supported by government-
backed comprehensive market development plans, which have 
allowed companies better access to strategic markets.5 Chart 6 
shows the contribution of the main regions to cumulative export 
BOX 7 NET EXPORTS OF NON‑TOURISM SERVICES IN SPAIN SINCE 2008
1  See Chapter 3, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
2  The non-tourism services heading includes the following: transport, 
construction, insurance and pension services, financial services, 
charges for the use of intellectual property, telecommunications, 
computer and information services, other business services, personal, 
cultural and recreational services, and government goods and services. 
For more details see The Balance of Payments and the International 
Investment Position: Methodological Note, January 2018, Banco de 
España.
3  There was a discontinuity in the structure of the Other services heading 
in 2013 as a result of changes in the ECIS, which made it necessary to 
estimate disaggregation by component based on additional information 
from transactions with the rest of the world provided to the Banco de 
España by financial institutions. More detailed information on the ECIS 
can be found at:  https://goo.gl/zuGktx.
4  This greater disaggregation of other business services is based on own 
estimates made using information from the records of transactions with 
the rest of the world and from the Survey on International Trade in 
Services.
5  Comprehensive market development plans are managed by ICEX and 
aim to support companies’ entry into difficult-to-access markets. The 
countries for which plans existed in 2015 were Algeria, Australia, Brazil, 
China, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United States, the Philippines, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Morocco, Mexico, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa and Turkey.
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BOX 7 NET EXPORTS OF NON‑TOURISM SERVICES IN SPAIN SINCE 2008 (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España, Eurostat and WTO.
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growth in 2008-2012 and 2012-2016, with Latin America in first 
place, followed by Asia in second. Thus, although the European 
Union represented the main destination for Spain’s exports of non-
tourism services in 2016 (approximately 52% of the total), its 
relative importance dropped by 4 pp between 2008 and 2016.
Bearing in mind the kind of service exported to each market, the 
boom in other business services is mainly explained by rising 
income from Asia and Europe, associated in Asia’s case with 
engineering firms, and in Europe’s case, with consultancy, and 
advertising and market research firms. Nevertheless, despite this 
positive trend in exports of engineering services to Asian countries 
in 2008-2016, the available information suggests that growth was 
weaker in 2017, which led to a slight slowdown in the expansion of 
non-tourism services exports as a whole last year. However, the 
growth trend under other headings and to other geographical 
destinations appears to have been sustained, with an increase in 
the share of exports to Europe, which, in conjunction with slower 
growth in imports, resulted in a slight increase in net exports of 
non-tourism services over the course of 2017.
To conclude, Spain’s trade in non-tourism services underwent 
considerable expansion in 2008-2016, driven by a diverse mix of 
internal and external factors. On the international level, the role of 
technological progress and trade deregulation stand out, together 
with the shift to a more service-based economy. Moreover, this 
process was more pronounced in the case of the Spanish economy 
as a result of competitiveness gains and the process of companies 
looking for new markets in response to the recession and 
supported by the comprehensive market development plans. It 
seems likely that global factors will continue to encourage the 
expansion of trade in other services over the coming years, and 
that internal factors will have a permanent impact on the levels of 
these trade flows, provided that the recent drive towards greater 
internationalisation of the Spanish productive system proves 
lasting.
BOX 7 NET EXPORTS OF NON‑TOURISM SERVICES IN SPAIN SINCE 2008 (cont’d)
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BOX 8 REFORM OF PENSION SCHEMES AND FUNDS
Pension schemes are long-term purpose-driven savings products 
mainly devoted to cover retirement. There are three types in Spain: 
occupational, professional-association1 and individual pension 
schemes. The first two are sponsored by firms, entities, trade 
unions or professional associations, and their beneficiaries are 
their employees or members, as appropriate. The third kind is 
sponsored by one or several financial institutions and their 
beneficiaries are individuals who make contributions. Pension 
funds are holding companies without legal status through which 
the savings generated by pension schemes are invested.
As Chart 1 shows, pension funds’ total assets have trended upwards 
from 2012 after several years of stability, exceeding €111 billion at 
December 2017 (€74.4 billion relate to individual pension funds and 
€36.7 billion to the other two categories together). This figure accounts 
for 9.5% of GDP which, in comparison with other OECD economies, 
would place Spain among the countries with the lowest weight of 
these instruments (see Chart 2). The differences between countries 
arise from differences in the degree of coverage by state schemes, 
household savings preferences and the policies adopted by each 
State to encourage these private schemes. In the case of Spanish 
households, the weight of pension funds relative to other financial 
investment alternatives is low (accounting for only 5% of their financial 
wealth). Also, although the share of pension funds has increased 
recently with respect to bank deposits, it has decreased very 
significantly in comparison with assets managed by collective 
investment undertakings (CIUs), i.e. investment funds and companies, 
and foreign CIUs.2
1  Professional-association pension schemes are of scant importance, 
accounting for only 1% of the total, and have been grouped together 
with occupational pension schemes for analysis.
2  For further details on the changes in and characteristics of pension 
schemes and funds, see the article “Evolución reciente de los planes y 
fondos de pensiones en España”, Boletín Económico, diciembre 2016, 
Banco de España.
SOURCES: Banco de España, OECD and Inverco.
a CIUs are Collective Investment Undertakings.
b Data on financial assets of households at September 2017.
c Weighted average. Greece and Luxembourg are not included.
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BOX 8 REFORM OF PENSION SCHEMES AND FUNDS (cont’d)
RD  62/2018 amending the pension scheme and pension fund 
regulations was enacted on 9 February 2018 to enhance the appeal 
of pension schemes as a long-term investment alternative. In this 
connection, it includes changes in different areas. Specifically, it 
incorporates the new provision on liquidity introduced in the 
pension law reform of 2014. This permits early access (effective 
from 1 January 2025) to rights corresponding to contributions 
made at least ten years previously starting from January 2015. It 
also adapts the procedures for mobilisation of pension scheme 
members’ rights in all cases of early withdrawal, and updates and 
relaxes the regime for assets eligible for pension fund investments, 
in line with the European regulations. Additionally, it reduces 
management costs by changing the maximum management and 
custodian fee limits applicable. Lastly, the maximum periods for the 
execution of orders relating to transfers between funds and for 
settlements in the event access is gained to vested rights are 
shortened, certain aspects relating to the valuation of contributions, 
rights and benefits are clarified, and the information requirements 
for members are extended, including those relating to the dates on 
which contributions are made and to possible future liquidity and 
taxation in the event of access to vested rights. 
The possibility for members to gain access to rights corresponding 
to contributions made at least ten years before to individual and 
professional-association pension schemes was established by 
the RD without setting any additional quantitative limit or condition 
in order to encourage the arrangement of and contribution to 
pension schemes, since this improves the liquidity of these 
products. As regards occupational schemes, the RD maintains 
the possibility of incorporating this option provided the scheme’s 
specifications allow it. 
The other important change introduced by the RD is the reduction 
of the maximum management and custodian fees collected by 
pension fund management and custodian companies as 
remuneration. Also, a system is established under which the single 
management fee (1.5% from October 2014) is replaced by fees 
that are applied based on the scheme’s focus and related risk 
levels. Thus, pension funds are classified into bond funds (no 
exposure to equities), mixed-income funds (less than 30% 
exposure to equities) and other (equity exposure of 30% or more 
of total assets), and the maximum fees are set at 0.85%, 1.3% and 
1.5%, respectively. The maximum custodian fee, which is common 
to the three categories, is reduced by five basis points, to 0.2%. 
This new system aims to contribute to improving pension scheme 
profitability and, consequently, to encourage enrolment in such 
schemes. It also encourages a larger fee reduction for funds with 
more prudent investment criteria (those with a greater fixed-
income component), which are predominant in Spain.
As shown in Charts 3 and 4, the management and custodian fees of 
pension funds linked to individual schemes are substantially higher 
than for occupational and professional-association schemes, which 
could be due to the greater negotiating power of the holders of the 
latter over fund managers. These fees are also higher than those 
applied to other savings instruments such as investment funds. 
However, these differences have declined in recent years, in line 
with the decrease in the legal ceilings applied to pension schemes. 
Against this background, it could be expected that the lowering of 
these limits in accordance with the RD will contribute to the 
narrowing of the distance between the fees applied to individual 
schemes and those applied to other financial products.
It is therefore foreseeable that the recent reform of pension 
schemes and funds will help to enhance the appeal of these 
instruments and will thus have a positive, albeit difficult to quantify, 
effect on the volume of schemes arranged, gaining importance as 
a supplement to the state pension scheme. 
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2 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The slight additional acceleration in global economic activity in 2018 Q1 and the expected 
effects of the US fiscal expansion (see Box 2) have given rise to upward revisions of the 
growth forecasts for the current year, in particular in the cases of the United States and the 
euro area. This has meant a further reduction in the expected productive slack in some 
advanced economies; accordingly, inflation forecasts have also been revised upwards. 
Indeed, albeit with a heterogeneous performance from one country to another, inflation 
has increased in the advanced economies as a whole to date in 2018, which might have 
implications for the pace of monetary policy normalisation. The financial markets, for their 
part, experienced some turbulence in early February, characterised by an across-the-
board correction of stock market indices and strong rises in volatility on these markets. 
Subsequently, these developments were partly reversed (see Box 3). This turbulence was 
related to a greater-than-expected increase in US wage data, which might prompt the Fed 
to step up the pace of monetary normalisation, and to the tariffs imposed by the US 
government. 
The turbulence closed a period which, until late January, had been marked by investor 
optimism, low volatility and the search for additional yield. Nonetheless, a prominent 
characteristic of the performance of international financial markets during this turbulence 
was that other market segments, such as sovereign debt and corporate debt spreads, 
were affected to a much lesser extent. The depreciating trend of the dollar which had been 
witnessed throughout the previous year – linked partly, perhaps, to the US economy’s 
external imbalance, as noted in Box 4 – appeared to come to a halt after this turbulence. 
However, the materialisation of the announced protectionist measures and the possible 
response by other countries notably hamper any future forecast for exchange rates. On 
bond markets, the fiscal impulse approved in the United States and the ensuing fears of 
sharper monetary tightening in this economy raised the yield on US long-term debt to 
2.9%, a development likewise observed – with less intensity – in other advanced 
economies. 
In the emerging economies, stock markets posted across-the-board gains until the 
above-mentioned period of turbulence. In any event, during the quarter only China posted 
losses, compared with the significant equities-related increases in Latin America. The 
weakness of the dollar enabled most emerging currencies to appreciate, with the 
exception of the Argentine peso, whose central bank anticipated a more expansionary 
monetary policy following the increase in the inflation target in 2018 and 2019 decided by 
the government. Net capital flows into these economies were substantial until mid-
January, in terms of both debt flows and, especially, stock market flows, rising to two-
year highs. However, negative flows were recorded in both cases in early February, 
especially in bonds, which subsequently picked up in part. 
Commodities prices rose by 3% in the last quarter, owing to the combined effect of 
dearer industrial metals and food. The developments in industrial metals prices are due 
to the sound performance of global economic activity. As to oil, the price of Brent 
oscillated throughout the quarter, rising to over 70 dollars per barrel, although it currently 
stands at levels close to those of the start of the year, at around 64 dollars. The increase 
in US production, among other factors, helps explain this correction. In any event, oil 
inventories have fallen considerably, though they still stand above the average for the last 
2.1  External environment 
of the euro area 
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five years, not only owing to the buoyancy of demand but also to the high degree of 
fulfilment of the output agreement entered into by the OPEC countries and other leading 
global producers. 
The GDP growth data for 2017 Q4 and the latest high-frequency indicators confirm the 
current robustness of global economic activity. In the advanced economies, US GDP 
grew at an annualised quarter-on-quarter rate of 2.5%, chiefly underpinned by private 
consumption and investment. In Japan, activity grew by 1.6% in annualised quarter-on-
quarter terms, attesting to the firmness of growth. The United Kingdom posted a 
quarter-on-quarter growth rate of 0.4%, slightly down on the previous quarter, owing to 
the lower growth of private consumption and the negative contribution of external 
demand. In these economies, the overall inflation rates trended in line with energy 
prices, evidencing something of an increase in certain areas. In the United States, the 
inflation rate held slightly above 2% from late 2017 to early 2018, while Japan posted in 
January its highest inflation rate since March 2015 (1.4%), driven mainly by an increase 
in food prices. The UK inflation rate held above its target, as a result of the depreciation 
of sterling, although in recent months it has stabilised at around 3%. Against this 
background, central banks have not made changes to their monetary policies, although 
expectations of policy rate rises have actually been revised. This was specifically the 
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a An increase in the index denotes an appreciation of the currency.
b Ten-year government debt yields.
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case in the United States – where a rise is expected at the March meeting and where 
the probability that there will be four rises in 2018 increased – and in the United 
Kingdom, where the Bank of England might raise its policy rate at its forthcoming 
meetings. 
In the emerging economies, activity in Q4 also performed favourably. In the case of 
China, GDP growth stabilised and, for 2017 as a whole, the related rate was 6.9%, with 
the economy’s dynamism increasing slightly for the first time since 2010. In India, GDP 
grew by 7.2% in Q4, posting its highest rate of increase since 2016 Q3, thanks to a 
strong rise in investment and in public spending, which allowed the adverse effects of 
demonetisation to be overcome. In Latin America, the data for Q4 showed positive 
growth rates, although in some cases, such as Brazil, these were very modest. In 
Mexico it was confirmed that the decline in activity in Q3 was temporary, while in 
Colombia and Peru GDP lost momentum. In Eastern Europe, the current favourable 
economic setting was confirmed by the growth data for Q4. As regards prices, inflation 
in Asia was uneven across the different countries, with opposing trends which, however, 
did not alter the stance of their monetary policies. In Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
meanwhile, inflation continued to fall in general. Consequently, the central banks of 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru cut their policy interest rate by 25 bp (to 6.75%, 4.50% and 
2.75%, respectively), signalling in the first two cases that the rate-reduction cycle might 
be over. Finally, the Russian central bank also continued to cut its policy rate, placing it 
at 7.5%. 
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a Percentage of labour force.
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The economic expansion in the euro area continued to be sound and across the board, with 
GDP growing by 2.5% over the year as whole. Activity continues to be driven by the ECB’s 
accommodative monetary policy and favourable financing conditions, improvements in the 
labour markets and increasingly stronger foreign trade. However, in the year to date, financial 
conditions became less easy, basically as a result of the fall in stock prices, affected by the 
adjustment in the US markets, and the additional euro exchange rate appreciation. Confidence 
indicators have also undergone a correction, although they are holding at historically high 
levels, suggesting that the expansionary inertia extended to the first quarter of the year. This 
is also suggested by the macroeconomic projections for the euro area drawn up by the ECB 
and published in March, which foresee quarter-on-quarter GDP growth for the area of 0.7% 
in Q1. Forecasts for the year as a whole revise growth expectations for 2018 upwards by 
0.2 pp in comparison with the December exercise, to 2.4%, and they maintain the forecasts 
for 2019 and 2020 at 1.9% and 1.7%, respectively (see Table 2).
2.2  The euro area and 
the monetary policy 
of the European 
Central Bank
SOURCES: Datastream, Banco de España, IMF and JP Morgan.
a The aggregate of the different areas has been calculated using the weight of the countries that make up these areas in the world economy, drawing on IMF 
information.
b Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines and Taiwan.
d Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and, from July 2013, Croatia.
e JP Morgan EMBI spreads. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Asia includes China, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philiippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The data on the new EU Member States relate to Hungary, Poland, Romania and, from 
July 2013, Croatia.
f A decrease in the index denotes a depreciation of the currency against the dollar.
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Despite the more favourable outlook for economic activity, a scenario of relatively low 
inflation persists in the euro area, still conditioned by the context of wage restraint. Core 
inflation, which excludes the more volatile components of prices, rose slightly to 1.2% in 
February, while the wage settlements stood at 1.6% at end-2017. The ECB’s latest 
forecasts foresee annual inflation of 1.4% in 2018 and 2019, which entails a downward 
revision for 2019 owing to the effect of the appreciation of the euro. For 2020 the 
expectation remains that overall inflation and the index which excludes energy and food 
will move closer to 2% (1.7% and 1.8%, respectively).
Against this backdrop of robust expansion and a contained inflation outlook, the 
Governing Council of the ECB has confirmed the measures it adopted in October, 
indicating the need to maintain the monetary stimulus. The accommodative monetary 
stance is determined by the low level of interest rates and the expectation that they will 
remain low over a prolonged period, by the extension of net purchases of securities under 
the net asset purchase programme (APP) at least until September 2018, by the large 
volume of the securities portfolio acquired over the three years during which the APP has 
been in place and by the commitment to reinvest securities as they mature for so long as 
may be necessary. Nevertheless, the Governing Council in March deleted from its 
statement the reference whereby, in the event of a deterioration in the economic situation 
or in financial conditions to levels incompatible with achieving the inflation objective, it 
would continue to be willing to increase the volume and/or duration of the asset purchase 
programme. 
Also, following the proposals and the road map published by the European Commission (EC) 
in 2017 Q4, in recent months the Eurogroup and the Ecofin have discussed on several 
occasions how to continue progressing towards a monetary union that is more complete 
and capable of absorbing shocks. Box 5 summarises the main elements of this discussion. 
In 2017 Q4, euro area GDP grew at a pace of 0.6% quarter-on-quarter, slightly lower than 
in Q3 when it had been revised upwards (see Table 3). Growth was underpinned by the 
increase in domestic demand (with investment playing a more central role) and in the 
external sector. In particular, private and government consumption slowed mildly, while 
investment quickened substantially, growing by 0.9% (as compared with 0.2% in Q3), 
against a background of very favourable financing conditions, high capacity utilisation 
and better profit expectations. As a result, the contribution of domestic demand, excluding 
changes in inventories, to GDP growth stood at 0.3 pp (against 0.2% pp in Q3). Meanwhile, 
the positive contribution of net external demand was once again significant, maintaining 
a contribution of 0.5  pp to quarter-on-quarter growth of GDP, accounted for by the 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF, MJ Economics and OECD.
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increase in exports associated with the improvement in world trade which enabled the 
adverse effects of the appreciation of the euro to be offset.
GDP grew across the board in Q4. In the larger economies, the increases were 0.6% in 
Germany and France, 0.7% in Spain and 0.8% in the Netherlands, set against a smaller 
increase in Italy (0.3%).
The latest conjunctural information points to a continuation of the expansionary stimulus 
in the opening months of the year. According to the ECB’s forecasts, GDP could grow by 
around 0.7% in 2018 Q1, easing subsequently. The qualitative indicators have shown a 
degree of contraction over the quarter. The declines were practically across the board, 
extending to the European Commission’s (EC) business confidence indicators (except 
those relating to construction, which improved) and to the survey-based opinions of 
purchasing managers (PMI), as well as to consumer confidence and job creation 
expectations reflected in the EC surveys (except, once again, in construction) (see Chart 5). 
Nevertheless, in many cases the confidence indicators remain close to their all-time highs. 
Turning to external demand, the assessment of order books from abroad and export 
expectations point to a favourable performance in these months. The information available 
from quantitative indicators for Q1 is still very incomplete and giving mixed signals. Thus, 
retail sales declined slightly in January, following a bigger fall in December, while new car 
registrations edged up in January for the second consecutive month. Lastly, the 
unemployment rate held at 8.6% in January.
As regards prices, inflation eased slightly in February, in line with expectations, to stand at 
1.2%, influenced by base effects on changes in the non-processed food and energy 
components. Core inflation increased slightly, to 1.2%, owing to a mild increase in services 
prices and in non-energy industrial goods. According to the ECB’s forecasts, inflation will 
rise to 1.5% in the coming months, with the average annual rate for 2018 standing at 
1.4%. Therefore, the contained behaviour of prices persists, to which the modest increase 
in unit labour costs contributes, against a background of a still-high degree of slack in 
certain labour market segments, despite the robust expansion of employment. The reforms 
SOURCES: European Commission, Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a Information available up to 13 March 2018.
b Average for the quarter. Latest figure available: January 2018.
c End of the period. Latest available figure: February 2018.
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made in this field in certain countries, the moderate increase in productivity and the 
application of indexation mechanisms – explicit or implicit – which index wages to past 
inflation, also contribute to explaining the low wage growth.
The strength of the economic expansion is reflected in the general government deficit, 
which could decline to 0.7% of GDP in 2018 for the euro area as a whole, according to the 
ECB’s March projections. In structural terms, however, the expected balance remains 
practically stable (around -1% of GDP); thus, the contribution of fiscal policy to growth 
would be practically neutral, although this diagnosis is subject to some uncertainty 
associated with the new German government’s budgetary plans.
The European Semester 2018 Winter Package confirmed the existence of imbalances in 
France, Portugal, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain, and of excessive imbalances 
in Cyprus and Italy. In the euro area as a whole, the EC highlights the correction of the 
current-account deficits and the high levels of public and private indebtedness, fuelled 
particularly, in this case, by the economic recovery. By contrast, current account surpluses 
remain at high levels. The banking sector has also reduced its vulnerability as a result of the 
increase in capital ratios and the decrease in non-performing loans, although some 
countries require further progress in this connection. However, new risks are discernible 
relating to the rise in house prices in some of the Member States, with signs of overvaluation 
in some cases.
Euro area financial conditions tightened somewhat during Q1, essentially as a result of 
the appreciation of the euro and the correction in equities markets (see Chart 7). 
Nonetheless, in the above-mentioned setting of robust expansion and a contained 
inflation outlook, the ECB Governing Council, at its January and March meetings, retained 
its accommodative monetary policy stance and reiterated its expectations that interest 
rates will hold at their current low levels for a prolonged period far beyond the horizon for 
net securities purchases. The interest rates for the main refinancing operations, the 
marginal lending facility and the deposit facility stand at 0%, 0.25% and -0.40%, 
respectively. The Council confirmed the decision taken in October last year to extend the 
APP program to at least September 2018, with a monthly pace of net securities purchases 
of €30 billion. The Council also foresees continuing to reinvest the principal of the 
securities in its portfolio as they mature for a prolonged period after the end of net 
purchases and, in any event, as long as may be necessary. With the APP having been in 
place for three years, the value of the portfolio acquired is €2,316 billion (more than 20% 
of euro area GDP) and reinvestments from March 2018 to February 2019 are expected to 
amount to €167 billion.
In the bond markets, government debt yields increased by around 20 bp as from end-2017 
in the case of the German Bund, whose average yield is standing at around 0.65% in 
March to date. This increase is consistent with a brighter macroeconomic outlook for the 
euro area, although a spillover effect cannot be ruled out from the rise in US long-term 
rates, which was somewhat sharper, widening the rate spread over Germany to more than 
220 bp (compared with 200 bp late last year). The slight rise in German yields did not pass 
through fully to the other euro area sovereign bonds, which translated into a fairly 
widespread contraction in sovereign spreads that was more marked in the case of the 
Spanish and Portuguese bonds. 
Turning to stock markets, the Eurostoxx 50 index fell by 3% over the quarter as a whole 
(after having receded by more than 9% from the highs recorded in January), against the 
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SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics and Banco de España.
a Q4 figure not available.
b Ireland is not included owing to the high volatility of its data.
c Year-on year rates, calculated on the basis of the non-centred quarterly moving average of the seasonally adjusted series.
d Normalised series for the period represented.
e Bank Lending Survey. Indicator = percentage of banks reporting a considerable increase + percentage of banks reporting some increase × 0.5 – percentage 
of banks reporting some decrease × 0.5 – percentage of banks reporting a considerable decrease. A positive value denotes an increase.
f Year-on-year rates of the original monthly series. Quarterly average.
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background of a substantial rise in volatility. The stock market adjustment episode in 
February – prompted by the perception of a greater inflationary risk and the implications 
for the course of US monetary policy – had a notable impact on other international markets, 
including those of the euro area, which have undergone sizeable corrections, despite the 
fact that the various market valuation metrics were not at levels as high as those in the 
United States. 
On the currency market, the exchange rate of the euro resumed an upward course, 
appreciating by around 2% in nominal effective terms during Q1 (see Chart 7.6). This 
behaviour was highly influenced by the euro’s appreciation against the dollar (by over 3%), 
which might prove paradoxical judging by the growing divergences in the outlook for the 
future course of monetary policy in both regions (see Box 4 concerning the factors 
explaining, from the standpoint of the dollar, the exchange rate between both currencies). 
The bilateral exchange vis-à-vis the yuan also entailed an appreciation of the euro, while 
the rate against the yen, on the contrary, weakened. 
SOURCES: Eurostat, Reuters and ECB.
a Implied inflation calculated on the basis of inflation swaps.
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The rate of expansion of loans to the private sector increased (see Chart 8). In the case 
of lending to non-financial corporations, the year-on-year increase rose in January to 
3.4%, while the related increase for loans to households held at 2.9%. The Bank 
Lending Survey in the euro area for 2017 Q4 suggests that the buoyancy of credit is 
being sustained by easier lending standards and by an increase in demand, in both 
cases for households and non-financial corporations alike. The year-on-year rate of M3 
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Estimated by the ECB using swap market data.
b AAA-rated issuers.
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stood at 4.6% in January, within the range in which it has been oscillating since spring 
2015. The year-on-year rate of the narrowest aggregate, namely M1 (cash plus sight 
deposits), was up 0.2 pp to 8.9%.
SOURCE: ECB.
a Adjusted for securitisation and other transfers.
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3  THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the Spanish economy’s GDP stood at 0.7% in 2017 
Q4, coinciding with that seen in the previous quarter (see Chart 9). The increase in output 
in the October-December period was essentially due to growth of domestic demand, 
whose positive contribution, nevertheless, decreased by 0.2 pp to 0.6 pp. This aggregate 
was less buoyant on account of the slowdown of investment in capital goods and other 
products, and of private consumption, which the quickening of residential investment 
failed to offset, while the rate of government consumption remained unchanged. Similarly, 
net external demand made a positive contribution of 0.1 pp to aggregate growth in Q4, in 
contrast with its negative contribution of 0.1  pp in the previous quarter. There was a 
slowdown of both exports and imports, although it was sharper in the case of the latter. In 
year-on-year terms, the growth rate of GDP held at 3.1% in 2017 Q4 and that of employment 
at 2.9%. In 2017 as a whole, GDP and employment both slowed by 0.2 pp, resulting in 
growth rates of 3.1% and 2.8%, respectively.
According to the latest conjunctural information, GDP is estimated to have grown by 
around 0.7% in 2018 Q1, a similar rate to that of the two preceding quarters. Domestic 
demand appears to continue to be the chief mainstay of GDP growth, at the same time as 
the available external sector indicators, which are still incomplete, would suggest a largely 
neutral contribution from external demand. Employment is estimated to have quickened in 
Q1. The regional information available for this period reveals that the adverse effects, 
which emerged in 2017 Q4 and were linked to heightened uncertainty resulting from the 
political situation in Catalonia, have stabilised somewhat. These effects – mainly limited to 
the Catalan economy – were more manifest in the indicators of domestic private spending 
and foreign tourism in the final stretch of 2017, although some of them are estimated to 
have unwound in the early months of 2018. As a result of the foregoing, this region could 
experience a slightly lower growth rate in the current quarter than the Spanish economy as 
a whole, as occurred in the previous quarter, and in contrast with its higher buoyancy in 
preceding quarters.
During 2017, inflation in terms of consumer prices showed a decreasing trend following its 
sharp rise at the beginning of that year which continued into early 2018. However, in 
February there was an increase in overall inflation whose dynamics in recent months have 
been dominated by the trajectory of energy prices. This performance differs from that of 
core inflation which has remained relatively stable over the last year, within a range of 
0.8%-1.4%. In the most recent period (January and February), the prices of services, non-
energy industrial goods and processed food quickened moderately, which has been offset 
by the deceleration of unprocessed food prices and a negative contribution over these two 
months as a whole from energy prices. Consequently, the year-on-year rates of change in 
the CPI and in the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy – the latter proxies core 
inflation – both reached 1.1% in February, a similar figure to that seen in December in the 
case of the former, whereas in the case of the latter it represents a quickening of 0.4 pp.
Spanish stock markets, in line with those of the rest of the euro area and the major 
international markets, were affected by the bout of instability which arose on US stock 
markets in early February, interrupting the rising trend in market prices since the beginning 
of the year. Following this episode, volatility stood at higher values than those prevalent in 
previous months and national indices have hardly recovered, accumulating losses in the 
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year to date. Specifically, at the cut-off date of this report, the IBEX-35 was 3.5% below its 
end-2017 levels, performing similarly to the EUROSTOXX 50, which slipped 3% in the 
same period (see Chart 10.1). The political situation in Catalonia has hardly influenced 
developments in the Spanish markets after the regional elections held in December 2017. 
On the sovereign debt markets, the Spanish ten-year bond yield stood at around 1.4% at 
the cut-off date, lower than at end-December, whereas the yield on its German equivalent 
rose by approximately 20 bp. Thus the spread between them narrowed to about 75 bp, 
although during the quarter it reached even lower levels (66 bp) not seen since April 2010. 
This movement is a consequence of the perceived improvement in the Spanish Treasury’s 
credit quality which was also reflected in the upgrading of its credit rating in January by 
Fitch. The average risk premia on fixed-income securities issued by Spanish financial and 
non-financial corporations on private debt markets have remained relatively stable since 
the end of 2017. Lastly, interbank rates have hardly changed and, consequently, the one-
year EURIBOR remains at a record low (-0.19%).
In recent months, financing conditions for households and non-financial corporations have 
continued to be very loose. These developments were reflected in the interest rates applied 
to loans to the private sector which have held at historically low levels. This is estimated to 
have boosted continued growth in demand for loans, as reflected by the pace of expansion 
of new lending, which has remained higher in the case of household financing. The growth 
in new lending volumes has contributed to the ongoing moderation of the year-on-year 
rate of decline in the stock of bank debt.
The latest conjunctural information suggests that the quarter-on-quarter rate of change in 
household consumer spending stood  at 0.6% in Q1, a similar performance to the previous 
quarter (see Chart 11). So far this year, quantitative indicators have slowed down somewhat 
compared with the previous quarter, as in the case of industrial production of consumer 
goods, or have shown the same performance as at the end of 2017, as in the case of 
social security registrations. Conversely, the qualitative indicators such as the indices 
of consumer confidence and retail trade or services PMI have tended to be more robust.
3.1  Household spending 
decisions
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Seasonally adjusted series.
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Available economic information confirms high growth rates of residential investment in Q1, 
although a slight slowdown is perceived with respect to 2017 Q4, a period when it 
experienced an unexpected, essentially temporary, rise. The coincident indicators, 
particularly those for employment, were notably buoyant. Open-market house prices, on 
information provided by the INE, continued to quicken in 2017 Q4, reaching a year-on-year 
growth rate of 7.2% compared with 6.7% in the previous quarter. This greater momentum 
in house prices was apparent in the new home and second-hand segments.
The interest rates applied to new loans to households varied slightly and held at low levels 
between September and January. The cost of bank financing for house purchases was 
2.1% in January, and that for new consumer credit and other lending was 6.3%, close to 
their historical lows in both cases (see Chart 10.2).
The proportion of new fixed-rate mortgages stabilised in recent months at around 40% 
after the considerable increase seen in 2015 and 2016. The improvement in mortgage 
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conditions in terms of maturity and interest rate has come to an end. The average loan-to-
value ratio (LTV) on new mortgage loans has increased since 2013 and stood at 65.6% at 
end-2017, its highest level since this series began. Nevertheless, that has not been 
accompanied by an increase in the proportion of higher-risk new mortgages, namely those 
with an LTV of more than 80%. 
The replies received to the January edition of the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) indicate that 
banks relaxed lending standards for households during 2017 Q4 in both segments (house 
purchase and consumer credit and other lending). Similarly, overall terms and conditions 
applied to credit to the household sector were also relaxed, specifically the margins on 
average loans, while those applied to riskier loans were tightened slightly. As for demand 
for loans, the BLS shows that requests for funds increased once more in both segments, 
anticipating that they will rise again in 2018 Q1.
This favourable mix of supply and demand factors resulted in the continued high momentum 
in the volume of new loans for house purchase and for consumer credit and other lending. 
SOURCES: INE, European Commission, ANFAC and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates calculated on the basis of the seasonally adjusted series.
b Quarter-on-quarter rates of 3-month moving average with three lags, calculated on the basis of the seasonally adjusted series. The dot corresponds to 
the quarter-on-quarter rate.
c Normalised confidence indicators (difference between the indicator and its mean value, divided by the standard deviation).
d 12-month moving sum.
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The growth of lending contributed to an easing of the year-on-year rate of decline in the 
stock of household debt to 0.7% in January, down 0.4 pp from September (see Chart 
10.3). By loan type, these developments were the result of a slight decline in the pace of 
contraction of loans for house purchase (down 0.1 pp to 2.7%) and a rise in the rate of 
increase of consumer credit and other lending (up to 5.7% in January from 4.8% recorded 
in September). In the house purchase segment, the rate of decline of the outstanding 
balance of debt is easing more slowly since the high rate of increase of new lending is 
being virtually offset by the quickening of repayments.
The latest available data suggests that the financial position of households has continued 
to strengthen in 2017 Q4. Thus, the debt ratio is estimated to have fallen to below 100% 
of GDI, owing to the expansion of income and, to a lesser degree, the decrease in the 
stock of debt. The debt burden ratio has barely changed (see Chart 12.1). Household net 
wealth seems to have increased again during the last quarter of the year given that the real 
estate component and, to a lesser degree, the financial component, have appreciated (see 
Chart 12.2). In recent years, the increase in financial assets held by Spanish households 
has been accompanied by portfolio rebalancing away from bank deposits towards other 
products such as investment funds and, to a lesser extent, pensions, which offer higher 
expected returns. The relative appeal of the latter could increase following the recent legal 
reform of pension funds and plans (see Box 8).
Business activity, proxied by the real value added of the market economy, appears to have 
grown in 2018 Q1 at a similar rate to that in 2017 Q4. The moderation of the industrial and 
energy sectors was worth noting.
Investment in capital goods in 2018 Q1 is estimated to have increased by slightly more 
than 1%. This would mean that this domestic demand component has grown somewhat 
more than in 2017 Q4. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the available information 
on quantitative and qualitative indicators is still very limited.
3.2  Business activity and 
investment
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The last data point in each series is an estimate.
b Cumulative four-quarter data.
c Includes bank lending and off-balance-sheet securitised lending.
d Estimate of interest payments and repayments of principal.
e Valuation based on estimated changes in stock of housing, average floor space and price per square meter.
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During recent months, the cost of bank lending to non-financial corporations has held at 
historically low levels. For instance, on the latest available information referring to January, the 
average interest rates on new loans for less than €1  million, a segment in which SME 
transactions are concentrated, stood at 2.9%, while the average interest rates on new loans 
for €1 million or more reached 1.7%. The cost of equity and the issuance of long-term fixed-
income rose slightly by approximately 20 bp and 30 bp, respectively, between September and 
February, while the cost of short-term fixed-income issues barely changed (see Chart 10.2).
Deposit-taking institutions participating in the BLS reported, in the latest edition for 
January, that credit standards for non-financial corporations remained unchanged in 2017 
Q4 as did overall terms and conditions. However, according to this survey, margins on 
average loans fell, whereas those on riskier loans were tightened (as with the terms and 
conditions for the collateral required, the amounts and non-interest expenses). According 
to the BLS, the demand for funds from this sector did not change either, although 
institutions anticipated that it would expand in 2018 Q1.
Against this background, lending activity to corporations continued to grow in recent 
months at a higher rate than in previous quarters, both in the segment of loans for less 
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Fomento, Markit, Oficemen and Banco de España.
a Seasonally adjusted series.
b 3-month moving average rates with three time lags, calculated on seasonally adjusted series. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rate.
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
-1
0
1
2
2015 2016 2017 2018
 INDUSTRY AND ENERGY  CONSTRUCTION
 MARKET SERVICES  AGRICULTURE
 MARKET ECONOMY
1  GROSS VALUE ADDED: MARKET ECONOMY (a)
Quarter-on-quarter rates and contributions 
%
CORPORATE DECISIONS CHART 13
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2015 2016 2017 2018
 CAPITAL GOODS AND INTANGIBLES  OTHER STRUCTURES
 NON-RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT
2  NON-RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT (a)
Quarter-on-quarter rates and contributions 
%
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2015 2016 2017 2018
 CONSTRUCTION SECTOR AFFILIATES
4  INVESTMENT INDICATORS (b)
%
50
52
54
56
58
60
2015 2016 2017 2018
 COMPOSITE PMI (right-hand scale)
3  ACTIVITY INDICATORS
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2018 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
than €1 million and in the segment for loans of €1 million and above, although in the latter 
case the rate of increase remains more moderate. As a result of these developments, in 
terms of balances outstanding, the rate of decline of loans extended by resident institutions 
to non-financial corporations eased slightly to 0.3% in January, 0.2 pp lower than four 
months earlier (see Chart 10.4). Financing via fixed-income securities, including debt 
issued by Spanish subsidiaries, continued to slow, a trend which has been present since 
March 2017, although the rate of increase held at positive values (4.2% in January). 
Consequently, the growth rates of the sector’s total debt remained at practically zero. 
The financial position of non-financial corporations is estimated to have improved again in 
2017 Q4, continuing the trend of recent years. Thus the debt ratio and, to a lesser degree, 
the debt burden ratio as a percentage of GDP appear to have fallen, essentially as a result 
of GDP growth (see Chart 14).
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Interest-bearing borrowing.
b The last data point in each series is an estimate.
c GDP data series is seasonally adjusted.
d Gross operating profit (GOP) plus financial revenue (FR).
e Total inflation-adjusted asssets less non-interest bearing liabilities.
f Ordinary net profit/net assets.
g Indicators calculated on the basis of annual CBSO data, or quarterly data where no annual data are available. A value of more (less) than 100 denotes higher 
(lower) financial pressure than in the base year.
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Although as yet incomplete, the information available for the first quarter suggests that net 
external demand made a broadly neutral contribution to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth 
following the slightly positive contribution recorded the previous quarter. This contribution 
is  estimated to have taken place in a context of accelerating foreign trade in goods and 
services, on both the import and export sides, compared with sluggish exports and 
stagnant imports in the previous quarter. In year-on-year terms, the contribution of net 
external demand to GDP growth appears to have returned to its previous upward path 
after a slightly negative contribution in the previous quarter, against the backdrop of an 
improving global economy, particularly in the euro area countries, which are Spain’s main 
export markets (see Chart 15).1 
Customs records for December showed higher growth in real flows of exports of goods 
than imports, at 4.7% and 1.6% year-on-year, respectively. By types of goods, the strong 
momentum of consumer durables, particularly vehicles, stands out among exports, after 
several months of weaker performance, partly associated with the process of adapting 
manufacturing plant to produce new models. Broken down by geographical region, 
exports to EU markets gained pace, such that, for the first time in several months, their 
growth exceeded that of non-EU exports, which slowed considerably after performing 
strongly the rest of the year. On the imports side, the increase in imports mainly comprised 
purchases of foreign consumer durables and intermediate goods. According to data for 
January, real export flows reported by large corporations showed sustained export growth 
in that month, alongside a slight acceleration in imports, with year-on-year rates reaching 
around 4% in both cases.  
According to the most recent information, foreign tourism picked up in the early part of the 
year, after slowing towards the end of last year, affected by the political conflict in Catalonia 
and the gradual normalisation of the geopolitical situation in some of Spain’s main 
competitor destinations, such as Turkey and some North African countries. Thus, the data 
for January reflected a recovery in the indicators for foreign tourism in Catalonia, with a 
marked upturn in tourist arrivals, overnight hotel stays, and tourist spending. Meanwhile, 
tourist arrival numbers for Spain as a whole returned to strong growth (5.2% year-on-year) 
after a slight drop the previous month. This reflected the recovery in some of Spain’s main 
source markets, such as France, Germany and Portugal (whereas the number of tourists 
from the United Kingdom barely rose) and the continued dynamism of markets further 
afield, such as the Nordic countries or the United States.  Larger visitor numbers in January 
also meant higher nominal tourist spending growth (to 5.6% year-on-year), despite the 
timid increase in average tourist spending, influenced by the slightly larger decrease in the 
length of average stay.  
The Spanish economy’s net lending position decreased in the most recent period. 
Specifically, the balance-of-payments surplus for 2017 as a whole was 1.9% of GDP 
(0.3 pp less than in 2016), as a result of the rising energy bill (driven by higher oil prices), 
which was partially offset by the bigger tourism services surplus and smaller income 
deficit, in a context of low interest rates.
The most recent data available on cross-border financial flows show that the financial 
account of the balance of payments, excluding the Banco de España, had a credit balance 
of €10.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 2017. This performance was the result of an increase 
3.3  The external sector 
and the balance of 
payments
1  Box 7 in this Quarterly Report gives a description of the trend in Spain’s net exports of non-tourism services over 
a longer time horizon.
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in resident agents’ exposure to foreign assets (€33.8 billion), which exceeded the increase 
in holdings of assets issued by Spanish residents that were held by agents in the rest of 
the world (€23.5 billion) and, to a lesser degree, the slightly positive net flow (around €650 
million) of transactions associated with financial derivatives. The positive flow of net 
acquisitions abroad by resident sectors was the outcome of investments under the heading 
of other investments (€17.3  billion), in the form of short-term bank deposits, portfolio 
investment (€14.8 billion) and, to a lesser extent, direct investment (€1.1 billion). Meanwhile, 
net investments in Spain by foreigners were concentrated mainly in portfolio investment 
(€23 billion), in particular the purchase of government debt securities (both short and long 
term), and other investment (€7.8  billion), whereas the flow of direct investment was 
negative (-€7.2  billion). By institutional sector, the sign associated with the net flow 
(difference between flows of assets and liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world, including 
derivatives) was in line with their net lending/borrowing. Thus net flows to the rest of the 
world were positive for other resident sectors (€26.6 billion), while other monetary financial 
institutions and, particularly, general government, raised funds from abroad in net terms 
(€3 billion and €13.9 billion, respectively). The Banco de España’s net financial transactions 
with the rest of the world presented a credit balance (€5.7 billion), which, since the start of 
the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme, had only happened in the second quarter of 
2017 (and marginally in the third quarter of 2015). This is probably a reflection of the fact 
that, in the last few months, a larger share of the liquidity generated by this programme in 
Spain was not passed on to the rest of the world. Cross-border financial flows, including 
those of the Banco de España, were also positive in 2017 as a whole, totalling an amount 
equivalent to 2.6% of GDP (see Chart 16.1), as resident sectors made net investments in 
foreign assets that exceeded those of foreign investors in Spain.
The latest information available on the international investment position (IIP) shows the 
Spanish economy’s net debt to the rest of the world to have dropped by €28.7 billion in the 
third quarter of 2017, to stand at 83.2% of GDP, 3.3 pp less than three months earlier (see 
Chart 16.2). This decrease in the debit balance was driven by the positive flow of both net 
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financial transactions (€12.3  billion) and other flows (€16.5  billion) in the period. The 
performance of the latter was partly due to the rising value of foreign assets held by residents 
and the decrease in holdings of non-resident agents, which offset the effect in the opposite 
direction caused by the rising euro. Spain’s gross external debt fell by 2.8 pp relative to GDP 
to 166.2%, which is 8.4 pp less than the peak reached in the first quarter of 2015.
After the deceleration in the last quarter of 2017, the labour market indicators for the first 
few months of the year suggest that employment may be more buoyant in the first quarter 
of 2018. Social security registrations continued to grow strongly, at a rate of 0.8% in 
February, in terms of the three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate of change for the 
seasonally adjusted series. The employment growth figures broken down by sector were 
also highly stable relative to the last quarter of 2017, with a slight slowing in non-market 
services and industry, which was offset by increased dynamism in construction. This 
information suggests that the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of employment in the first 
quarter of the year, in QNA terms,2 is likely to rise by 0.2 pp to 0.7 %, narrowing the gap 
3.4  The labour market
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relative to growth in social security registrations, which widened in the previous quarter. In 
the case of the market economy, the rate of employment growth is expected to rise by 0.4 
pp to 0.8% (see Charts 17.1 and 17.2).
The drop in unemployment registered by the National Public Employment Service (SEPE 
by its Spanish abbreviation) maintained its pace in February at 1.9% in terms of the three-
month moving average and seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter rate of change (see 
Chart 17.2). In this context, the number of new contracts registered by the SEPE reverted 
to the more moderate path seen throughout 2017, with a year-on-year increase of 6.5% 
in February. The faster pace of hiring affected permanent contracts more than temporary 
ones, such that the share of permanent relative to total contracts rose by almost 1 pp 
compared with the same period of the previous year, to 11.3%.
As regards the performance of wages at the start of 2018, there is no agreement between 
social partners to guide wage recommendations. In this context, the information on 
collective bargaining agreements registered between January and February reflects an 
increase in wage rates of 1.5% for this year, slightly higher than that agreed for the previous 
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rates of change calculated on seasonally adjusted series.
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year. The agreements registered up to February cover almost 4.8 million workers, a higher 
figure than was observed in the same period in the eight preceding years. Almost all the 
agreements originate in those signed in previous years, as is commonly the case in the 
early part of the year. Moreover, the information from the tax collection agency on average 
gross compensation of large non-financial corporations showed a slight acceleration in 
January, with a year-on-year increase of 0.8% in terms of the seasonally adjusted series 
(0.3% in the fourth quarter of 2017). In line with the foregoing indicators, compensation per 
employee in the fourth quarter of 2017, in terms of the QNA seasonally adjusted series, 
registered moderate year-on-year growth, in both the total economy and the market economy, 
at 0.2% and 0.3%, respectively. Wage growth is expected to pick up slightly in the first 
quarter of 2018, albeit with less intensity than that observed in the tax revenue agency data, 
rising by around 0.3 pp to 0.6% in the market economy (see Charts 17.3 and 17.4). 
Year-on-year growth in the import deflator is estimated to have decreased considerably 
in the first quarter of 2018, continuing the downward trend from the preceding quarters. 
Domestic producer prices, approximated by the GDP deflator, gained pace at the start of 
2018, whereas the growth of the private consumption deflator remained moderate (see 
Chart 18.1).
The CPI data for February, the most recent month for which data are available, shows a 
sharp increase in the year-on-year growth rate, rising 0.5 pp from January to 1.1%. The 
acceleration in the overall index is basically a result of changes in energy prices, for which 
the year-on-year rate rose 3.1 pp, influenced by base effects, although the non-energy 
component also accelerated 0.1 pp to a year-on-year rate of 1%. Inflation in unprocessed-
food prices decelerated in February, as it did in the preceding months. Core inflation, 
measured in terms of the year-on-year growth rate of CPI excluding unprocessed food and 
energy rose by 0.3 pp, also coming to 1.1%. All the components of this aggregate 
accelerated: prices of services rose by 0.4 pp, prices of processed food by 0.3 pp and 
prices of non-energy industrial goods rose by 0.2 pp.
Lastly, the year-on-year rate of change of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) rose 
by 0.5 pp in February to 1.2%. By contrast, according to the preliminary estimate, the inflation 
rate across the Euro area as a whole dropped by 0.1 pp in February to 1.2% year-on-year. As 
a result, if the estimated rise in the HICP in the euro area is confirmed, the inflation differential 
between Spain and the euro area as a whole would shrink to zero (-0.6 pp in January).
13.03.2018.
3.5  Prices
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RESULTS OF NON‑FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS TO 2017 Q4: PRELIMINARY 
YEAR‑END DATA
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 22 March 2018
Non-financial corporations continued to create employment in 2017, with the trend extensive to 
all sectors according to the CBSO quarterly sample. As to business activity, although both gross 
value added and ordinary net profit continued to grow, they did so at a more moderate pace than 
the previous year, largely owing to the negative performance of certain large corporations with a 
high weight in the quarterly sample. The non-recurrent items had an unfavourable impact on the 
final surplus, leading it to shrink significantly. Lastly, the returns on ordinary activities rose and the 
debt and debt burden ratios declined, suggesting a further improvement in firms’ economic and 
financial situation. The article also analyses recent developments in trade credit, where there was 
evidence last year of a pick-up in this financing arrangement, accompanied by reductions in 
average payment and collection periods.
GLOBAL FUNDING TRENDS IN CAPITAL MARKETS IN 2017
Alberto Fuertes, Luis Molina, Luna Romo and Emilio Muñoz de la Peña
Published on 13 March 2018
The total volume of bond issuance in 2017 remained similar to that in previous years, edging 
down slightly as a result of the drop in public-sector issuance. As usual, there were significant 
differences between the regions and quarters analysed. By quarters, the year got off to a good 
start, with strong growth in the volume of issuance in the first quarter, followed by a slight 
deceleration. This pattern possibly reflects some issuers seeking to bring forward their placements 
in anticipation of worsening financial conditions, given the context of progressive monetary 
policy tightening. By region, the drop in issuance by the United States stands out, alongside the 
strong performance of the emerging markets. There was also a marked increase in the volume of 
placements in higher-risk segments, such as corporate and high-yield bonds, and in emerging 
markets, which reached record levels.
THE FLATTENING OF THE YIELD CURVE IN THE UNITED STATES
Juan Carlos Berganza and Alberto Fuertes
Published on 9 March 2018
The yield curve for US government debt securities has flattened significantly since late 2016 and 
its slope, while positive, has fallen to levels not observed since before the global financial crisis. 
The inversion of the yield curve slope is considered, on occasions, as a leading indicator of future 
recessions. And this, given moreover that the current expansionary phase is proving more 
durable than previous upturns, has prompted debate on the implications of the recent flattening 
of the curve. However, as illustrated in this article, unlike previous episodes, in which the flattening 
of the curve was explained by the behaviour of the interest rates expected at different terms, at 
this current juncture it is warranted substantially by the compression of term premia. Against this 
background, the historical relationship between the yield curve and predicted recessions in the 
US economy might have altered.
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EURO AREA INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Ricardo Gimeno and Eva Ortega
Published on 28 February 2018
This study explores the recent dynamics of inflation expectations for the main euro area 
countries. It uses daily financial data for the main euro area countries over the past 15 years 
with a wide range of time horizons. The estimation of a model of the term structure of inflation 
expectations using these data allows the common part to be separated from the country-
specific part. It is found that, for the various time horizons and countries, the bulk of expected 
inflation is common to the whole euro area. The weight of country-specific factors is low, being 
most significant for the shorter term. For time horizons between five and ten years, the 
estimated inflation expectations showed a downward trend from 2012, which has reversed in 
the last two years owing to the application of a broad set of unconventional monetary policy 
measures in the euro area since mid-2014. Still, in the past year, medium-term inflation 
expectations have held below 2%, around 1.7% on average, clearly lower than in the period 
before the economic crisis.
THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT IN HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
DECISIONS IN SPAIN
Jose María Casado
Published on 8 February 2018
This article analyses the relationship between household consumption and that in their social 
environment, defined as those households that live in nearby geographical areas. The results, 
drawn from the Spanish Household Expenditure Survey, reveal that, on average, approximately 
one-third of the non-durable goods consumption of the average Spanish household is influenced 
to some extent by the decisions of its peer group, a magnitude that is in line with the evidence 
available for other countries. The influence of the social environment appears to be greater for 
certain specific goods, such as tobacco, clothing, leisure activities and alcohol. This analysis 
may help us understand how specific shocks, which initially have a direct bearing only on the 
expenditure of very specific population groups, ultimately affect the consumption of other, 
broader population groups.
THE JANUARY 2018 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Alvaro Menéndez Pujadas
Published on 23 January 2018
The results of the Bank Lending Survey show that during 2017 Q4 credit standards for new loans 
in Spain eased slightly in loans to households and were stable in loans to enterprises. The pattern 
was similar in the euro area, except in the case of consumer credit and other lending to 
households, where credit standards barely changed. Households’ demand for credit rose 
moderately in both areas, while demand from enterprises grew in the euro area but remained 
unchanged in Spain. As regards funding received by banks, both Spanish and euro area banks 
generally perceived some improvement in access to retail markets and to almost all wholesale 
markets. Lastly, in both areas, regulatory and supervisory measures seem to have prompted 
some increase in capital levels and risk-weighted assets. Spanish banks assessed these 
measures as having no significant impact on their funding conditions or on credit standards or 
margins on loans. In the case of the euro area, the measures appear to have brought a slight 
easing of bank funding conditions, while the effect on credit standards and margins on loans has 
generally been small.
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THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROSYSTEM’S CORPORATE SECTOR PURCHASE 
PROGRAMME ON SPANISH COMPANIES
Óscar Arce, Ricardo Gimeno and Sergio Mayordomo
Published on 18 January 2018
In March 2016, the ECB announced the extension of the asset purchase programme (APP) 
to investment-grade bonds issued by non-financial corporations established in the euro 
area. Following the announcement of this new programme (known as the CSPP), there was 
a significant fall in the interest rates on bonds issued by Spanish companies eligible for 
purchase by the Eurosystem, which also extended to those on lower-rated securities, 
through the usual rebalancing of investment portfolios. At the same time, a significant 
increase was seen in bond issuance, as a result of which Spanish bond issuers (usually large 
corporations) reduced their demand for bank credit. Resident banks responded by shifting 
their credit offering towards other firms that do not have the same ability to issue bonds and 
that tend to be smaller in size. The analysis presented in this article reveals that for each 
euro reduction in the outstanding debt of large companies with Spanish banks during the 
three months after the announcement of the programme, some 78 cents were diverted to 
other non-issuing firms, including SMEs. These firms, in turn, increased their levels of real 
investment significantly.
LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION RATE IN THE EURO AREA: PERFORMANCE AND 
OUTLOOK, A LONG‑TERM VIEW
Cristina Fernández and David Martínez Turégano
Published on 11 January 2018
This article analyses the trajectory and the main explanatory factors of changes in the labour 
market participation rate in the euro area in recent decades. First, these changes are compared 
with the United States, highlighting the extraordinary convergence that has taken place between 
the two areas owing to the momentum in the European labour market and the declining secular 
trend on the other side of the Atlantic. Second, the increase in participation in the euro area was 
led by females, particularly as a result of the higher probability of new cohorts joining the labour 
market against a background of significant socio-educational changes. In any event, in view of 
the demographic ageing in progress and the progressive exhaustion of the above-mentioned 
changes, the focus is on the need for specific policies aiming to raise labour participation of 
such population groups where there is still room to do so, i.e. older workers, in general, and 
women in countries where the gender gap is still large.
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REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO MARKET FUNDING
Mar Delgado and Javier J. Pérez
Published on 15 February 2018
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COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using 
the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
ABS Asset-backed securities
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
BRICs Brazil, Russia, India and China
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAIRU Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OJ L Official Journal of the European Union (Legislation)
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPEE National Public Employment Service
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
